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INTRODUCTION 
The struggle between making progress and preserving tradition 
is as old as time.1 On the one hand, progress is needed to move 
forward, to grow, to expand, to become more prosperous, and—
perhaps most importantly—to prevent being left behind.2 On the 
other hand, tradition is what links society to its past, gives a sense 
of history and roots, and creates a common culture that binds 
everyone together.3 In the context of legal reform, how does one 
move a legal system forward, yet still maintain the institutions that 
make such a system so unique?  
In many ways, tradition and reform are natural adversaries. The 
former calls for a preservation of the known, of the familiar, and of 
the steadfast, while the latter calls for a questioning of the status 
quo and skepticism about the current state of affairs. A given 
country’s long-standing legal institutions bring about a sense of 
comfort and predictability and engender a feeling of expertise and 
common knowledge. Often times these traditional legal concepts 
come about due to the particular history, characteristics, and 
experiences of the people who have lived in the locale over time.4 
                                                                                                             
 1. See generally Jiang Chang & Feng Jun, The Contemporary Conflict of 
Values § 1 (Paideia Project, Twentieth World Cong. of Philosophy, Working 
Paper, 1998), available at https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Valu/ValuChan.htm, 
archived at https://perma.cc/X9SC-GDBG. 
 2. See, e.g., Progress and Tradition Struggle to Mix in Cambodia, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b 
/14f3128f-837b-44f3-b5db-88f520c50f10, archived at http://perma.cc/3X4K-
3QWU. 
 3. See YVES CONGAR, THE MEANING OF TRADITION 8–9 (A.N. Woodrow 
trans., Hawthorn Books 1964); PASCAL BOYER, TRADITION AS TRUTH AND 
COMMUNICATION: A COGNITIVE DESCRIPTION OF TRADITIONAL DISCOURSE 3–6 
(1990). 
 4. See Patrick J. Charles, History in Law, Mythmaking, and Constitutional 
Legitimacy, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 27 (2014) (describing the influence of 
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As such, the legal tradition of a place is intimately bound up in the 
very culture and spirit of its people. Historical laws create a sense of 
community such that those who belong to the community may be 
readily identified, and those who are outsiders are disadvantaged 
and kept at a distance.  
Legal reform, on the other hand, plays quite the opposite role. 
It challenges the historical and the traditional in a quest to find the 
new and the better. Reform is often undertaken when traditional 
institutions prove to be out-muted or inefficient in the face of 
changing economic, cultural, or political forces.5 Further, reform 
often accompanies larger regional or global movements toward 
uniformity or harmony among various laws—particularly in the 
commercial context.6 As such, legal reform seeks not to maintain 
the divide between those on the inside and those on the outside, but 
rather to break down barriers such that persons have equal 
opportunities and a level playing field from which to operate and 
interact.7 
But legal reform never happens in a vacuum.8 As lawmakers 
engage in the process of revising, amending, or completely 
overhauling a given set of laws, the process is heavily influenced 
by psychological and sociological undercurrents, which can 
frequently operate at a subconscious level.9 While the intent may 
be to replace or supplant a given area of the law with a completely 
new system, the innate pull of the past and the powerful influence 
                                                                                                             
 
history in the interpretation of American constitutional principles); see also 
Stuart Banner, Legal History and Legal Scholarship, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 37, 42–
44 (1998). 
 5. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, Is the Wisconsin State Constitution 
Obsolete? Toward a Twenty-First Century, Functionalist Assessment, 90 MARQ. 
L. REV. 425, 425–26 (2007). 
 6. See generally Franco Ferrari, General Principles and International 
Uniform Commercial Law Conventions: A Study of the 1980 Vienna Sales 
Convention and the 1988 Unidroit Conventions on International Factoring and 
Leasing, 10 PACE INT’L L. REV. 157 (1998); see also Scott J. Burnham, 
Perspectives on the Uniform Laws Revision Process, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 603, 
604–05 (2001). 
 7. See John McClaugherty, The Uniform Law Process: Lessons for a New 
Millennium, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 535, 539–40 (2002); see also John 
Linarelli, The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking, 48 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1387, 1394–96 (2003); Neil B. Cohen, Harmonizing the Law Governing 
Secured Credit: The Next Frontier, 33 TEX. INT’L L. J. 173, 176–77 (1998). 
 8. See generally Frank M. Coffin, The Problem of Obsolete Statutes: A 
New Role for Courts?, 91 YALE L.J. 827 (1982) (discussing the role of judges in 
reforming outmoded statutes). 
 9. See infra Part IV.A–B and accompanying discussion. 
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of tradition often pervade and inform the legal reform process.10 
An unwillingness to surrender traditional institutions which have 
been such an important part of the history and culture of a given 
jurisdiction can weaken, hinder, or even thwart good-intentioned 
efforts to revise and reform the law to make it more modern and 
efficient. Thus, in order to engage in truly effective legal reform in 
any particular area of the law, it is necessary to understand the role 
that tradition and history can play in influencing the lawmaking 
process so as to ensure that reforms are done in a way that creates a 
truly clear, competitive, and coherent body of laws that reflect the 
public policy goals of the people. 
This Article is concerned with the tradition–reform dichotomy 
as it exists in certain jurisdictions that, because of their unique 
history and nature, are particularly susceptible to the struggle 
between legal tradition and legal reform—mixed jurisdictions. In 
order to more closely examine this struggle and its theoretical and 
practical effects, this Article analyzes the role that traditional legal 
institutions play in the law reform process through the lens of 
America’s lone mixed jurisdiction—Louisiana—and how this 
struggle results in an anchor-like legal conundrum. 
Through an exploration of Louisiana’s subtle, yet prevalent, 
anchor effect caused by the struggle between progress and 
tradition—the process of mooring one’s self to existing institutions 
to such a degree that newly adopted institutions are rendered less 
effective and the law as a whole suffers—one is able to extrapolate 
as to how traditional and historical forces play a role in the much 
larger sphere of mixed jurisdictions globally. This investigation is 
accomplished by analyzing two major commercial law concepts 
that have been the subject of the collision between legal reforms on 
the one hand and the maintenance of existing civil law institutions 
on the other. Specifically, this includes reviewing the interaction 
between the civil law’s traditional warranty of condition in the sale 
of property—redhibition11—and its interplay with the American 
Uniform Commercial Code’s similar concept—the warranty of 
                                                                                                             
 10. See infra Part IV.B. 
 11. See generally DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, SALES §§ 
11:1–11:48, in 24 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2012) (Redhibition is a civil 
law-based, Louisiana-specific legal institution dealing with the warranties 
provided by sellers to buyers relative to the condition of the thing sold.); 1 
PETER S. TITLE, LOUISIANA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 10:82 (2d ed. 2006) 
(distinguishing redhibitory defects from restrictions on use); Elizabeth A. 
Spurgeon, Comment, All for One or Every Man for Himself? What is Left of 
Solidarity in Redhibition, 70 LA. L. REV. 1227 (2010) (providing a historical 
account of redhibition under Louisiana law). 
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fitness.12 Also, Louisiana’s quasi-adoption of the common law 
doctrine of unconscionability in contracts is explored against the 
backdrop of one of Louisiana’s traditional civilian institutions of 
contractual vices known as lesion beyond moiety.13 Lastly, this 
Article explores the broader social science and psychological 
aspects behind this anchoring effect by exploring society’s inherent 
desire to hold on to traditional customs and practices, and to resist, 
even if only subconsciously, certain change.14 
Through an understanding of these Louisiana legal concepts 
and institutions—sometimes identical, other times opposing—and 
their interplay, one gains a better recognition and understanding of 
the anchor effect and its negative consequences, particularly in the 
commercial law realm, on all mixed jurisdictions. And through 
such an understanding, mixed jurisdictions are better able to 
structure their laws so that their public policies with respect to 
commercial viability and competitiveness are furthered and in 
harmony with—rather than frustrated, undercut, or anchored down 
by—their traditional and historical institutions. 
I. AMERICA’S LONE MIXED JURISDICTION—LOUISIANA 
Although this Article explores the legal tradition–reform 
struggle in Louisiana in order to extrapolate the anchor effect’s 
impact on mixed jurisdictions worldwide, it is essential that one 
have a general understanding and appreciation of the nature and 
history of mixed jurisdictions. It is through an appreciation of the 
distinctive condition, history, and culture that informs the law 
making process in these unique locales that one can perceive how 
acute the struggle between tradition and reform can be in the 
bijural experience.  
A. An Overview of Mixed Jurisdictions 
Although no official definition exists, the preeminent Scottish 
comparative law scholar Sir Thomas Smith described mixed 
jurisdictions as those that are “basically a civilian system that had 
been under pressure from the Anglo-American common law and 
has in part been overlaid by that rival system of jurisprudence.”15 
In America, Louisiana clearly fits into this dichotomy, but so do 
                                                                                                             
 12. See infra Part I.B. 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE 
THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 7 (2d ed. 2012). 
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many other countries, the legal foundations of which are built on 
the civil law, but because of force, necessity, or time have been 
built up with common law institutions.16 Some of these better-
known localities include South Africa, Scotland, Israel, Puerto 
Rico, the Philippines, and Quebec.17 
Understanding the features of what makes a country a mixed 
jurisdiction is essential to appreciating its susceptibility to the 
anchor effect.18 The noted civil law and comparativist scholar 
Vernon Valentine Palmer describes mixed jurisdictions as exhibiting 
three principal “lowest common denominator” characteristics.19 The 
first involves analyzing the mixture itself.20 Although it is true that 
the law of every country is influenced by a myriad of factors such as 
religious doctrine, Roman law, and custom, only in mixed 
jurisdictions is a significant body of the country’s law derived solely 
from the civil law and common law systems.21 In this way, 
Professor Palmer directs the analysis toward a sort of threshold 
requirement—the mere influence of multiple facets and aspects of 
various laws on the country’s legal system is not enough, but rather 
a fundamental portion of the law must originate from these two 
major legal traditions.22 The second characteristic is more abstract 
and involves the subconsciousness and psyche of the mixed 
jurisdiction.23 Professor Palmer distinguishes countries that merely 
transplant legal concepts from one tradition to the other from mixed 
jurisdictions that exhibit a certain cognizance about their bijurality.24 In 
a mixed jurisdiction, there is a general affirmative acknowledgement by 
the legal community that the law of that country represents a fusion of 
common and civil law concepts.25 The third and final trait is the law’s 
structure.26 In a mixed jurisdiction there will generally be a walling 
off of certain areas of the law and a sort of demarcation as to which 
system dominates.27 For instance, the private law—which includes 
the law of persons, delicts, family, property, and importantly for these 
purposes, contracts—will be substantially civilian in appearance and 
                                                                                                             
 16. See id. at 7–10. 
 17. Id. at 13. 
 18. See id. at 13–14. 
 19. Id. at 8–11. 
 20. Id. at 8. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 9. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 8–9. 
 27. Id. at 9–10. 
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order.28 On the other hand, public law in such a jurisdiction—
comprising the separation of governmental functions, the role of 
the judiciary, and constitutional rights—will be led by the English 
tradition.29 
Much like with Louisiana, many mixed jurisdictions acquired 
their bijural character through a series of intercolonial transfers 
between traditionally civil law countries (such as France and 
Spain) and countries that were dominated by the common law 
(such as Britain and the United States).30 That is not to say that 
when a traditionally civil law country came under the control of a 
common law government that a change or mixing of legal systems 
was a forced or even immediate event.31 On the contrary, many 
times the change and mixing came gradually.32 For instance, 
Quebec was ceded by France to Great Britain at the conclusion of 
the Seven Years War in 1763.33 Puerto Rico and the Philippines 
came under United States control after the Americans defeated 
Spain in the Spanish-American War.34 After such conquests or 
annexations, the new governments would often impose traditional 
common law structures in the area of public and criminal law, but 
leave the civil law in place to be more gradually assimilated.35 This 
was done, in large part, for political reasons as the imposition of a 
new system of private law in largely non-Anglophonic populations 
could prove disastrous and disrupt public order and stability.36 
Instead, the strategy for a more slow and steady integration was 
adopted.37 It is through this gradual assimilation of common law 
concepts into the private civil law system of mixed jurisdictions 
that the right conditions were created for the anchor effect to arise 
and take hold.38  
This Article focuses on the anchor effect’s impact on 
commercial law because, both historically and in modern times, it 
is the area of the law that is most susceptible to the tradition–
reform struggle.39 As briefly discussed above, the maintenance of 
the civil law in the area of private transactions can be best 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. at 10. See generally STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING 
(Esin Örücü et al. eds., 1996) (exploring the structures of mixed jurisdictions). 
 29. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 10–11. 
 30. See id. at 25. 
 31. Id. at 27. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 26. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 27, 29. 
 37. Id. at 27, 79–81. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. at 79. 
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described as a means to keep the peace and stability of a newly 
conquered or annexed country.40 Instead of imposing the common 
law upon all private matters immediately, a more gradual 
assimilation was favored.41 Maintaining existing commercial laws, 
at least for the time being, served a particularly useful purpose for 
these colonial powers.42 Commercial laws are those that govern the 
everyday interactions of private individuals.43 The very economic 
viability of a country—from the purchasing of food and goods to 
the selling of wares—is rooted in its commercial laws.44 The 
importance of these constructs is even more evident when viewed 
through the lens of colonial mercantilism, which sought in many 
ways to strengthen the economic might of the parent country by 
utilizing the resources of its colonial holdings.45 
So although mixed jurisdictions acquired their unique bijural 
personalities through their colonial experiences, it was specifically 
their commercial viability—either for their merchant and maritime 
successes or their lucrative natural resources—that made these 
areas attractive to colonial powers to begin with.46 Because a 
country’s commercial strength or potential held such a prominent 
place in what made it so desirable for conquest, it is natural that the 
civil law institutions governing such commerce would be held dear 
by its people. Further, the people of these conquered or annexed 
countries were typically mistrustful of their new rulers and displayed 
a strong desire to hold on to their cultures and traditions,47 and the 
law of the marketplace was an obvious object for such affinity. 
Thus, this area of private law was a natural anchoring point for these 
newly subjugated societies—as all other semblances of self-
government and control were pulled away and replaced with 
colonial, public law structures. Thus, maintaining the private law 
                                                                                                             
 40. Id. at 26–27. 
 41. Id. at 27, 79–81. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. See id.; see also Michael J. Stepek, The Importance of Commercial Law 
in the Legal Architecture of Post-Conflict “New” States, 60 ME. L. REV. 487, 
497–502 (2008) (discussing the importance of commercial law in nation-state 
building).  
 45. See GUSTAV SCHMOLLER, THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM AND ITS 
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE 57–59 (W.J. Ashley ed., London, MacMillan & Co. 
1896).  
 46. See, e.g., PHILIP J. STERN & CARL WENNERLIND, MERCANTILISM 
REIMAGINED: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN EARLY MODERN BRITAIN AND ITS EMPIRE 
(2013). 
 47. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 27–29. 
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then in place was a way to feel a sense of self-preservation and 
permanence.48  
As for the early common law rulers of these mixed 
jurisdictions, they would find it more politically expedient to allow 
existing commercial laws to remain in place since the dominant 
social groups of the area had such strong cultural ties to them.49 The 
calculation was often made that the invisible hand of the larger 
regional, continental, or global marketplace would eventually push 
away existing civilian commercial institutions to make room for 
more dominant common law concepts.50 As Professor Palmer notes, 
the assimilation of common law or more mainstream commercial 
concepts did not come from outside forces, but from internal 
business interests desiring to align the country’s economy more 
closely with prevailing commercial practices.51 Thus, just as 
discussed below in the case of Louisiana, it was self-interest and 
economic motivation that gave birth to the incorporation of foreign 
legal concepts into the traditionally civil law sphere of these 
jurisdictions.52 
In reviewing this interaction and gradual, but voluntary, 
assimilation, one can easily see how the symptoms so common to 
the anchor effect could arise. First, each country was allowed to 
keep an area of the law that was culturally and historically its own, 
despite the fact that the new colonial power was substituting 
common law structures for the domestic public laws then in 
place.53 Because this one area was allowed to remain, it would 
serve as a natural source of pride and attachment for the country.54 
This is particularly true since the area of commercial law is chiefly 
concerned with the livelihood and economic prosperity of the 
country and its people.55 However, by the same token, prevailing 
commercial practices—either of the governing country or of the 
region—would be brought to bear on the idiosyncratic nature of 
the existing civil law institutions.56 For instance, South Africa, a 
country that is historically civilian in nature, would feel the 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. at 26–27. 
 49. See id. at 27–29. 
 50. Id. at 79–81. 
 51. Id. at 81. 
 52. See id.  
 53. Id. at 26–27. 
 54. See generally Sylvia Wairimu Kang’ara, Beyond Bed And Bread: 
Making The African State Through Marriage Law Reform—Constitutive And 
Transformative Influences of Anglo-American Legal Thought, 9 HASTINGS RACE 
& POVERTY L. J. 353 (2012) (describing the struggle of Africans under colonial 
rule when faced with the invalidation of their customary law-based marriages). 
 55. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 79–81. 
 56. Id. 
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economic impetus to fashion its laws to more closely resemble the 
laws of Great Britain, which historically dominated the global 
commercial marketplace.57 Similarly, Puerto Rico and the Philippines 
would also feel the need to adapt to the commercial practices of its 
American rulers whose economic influence infiltrated commercial 
and business transactions worldwide.58 
In sum, the human tendency to anchor one’s self to the familiar, 
the traditional, and the well-known is powerfully exemplified in the 
experience of mixed jurisdictions. Through this dichotomy it is easy 
to see how, in the legal reform process, efforts would inevitably be 
made to keep certain traditional laws in place even when similar, 
duplicative, or even conflicting new laws were enacted. This 
would seem particularly true given the strong desire of conquered 
countries to retain aspects of their law that had long enjoyed strong 
cultural significance.59 The unique and singular nature of mixed 
jurisdictions—representing a stand-alone holdout of the civil law 
tradition, yet encircled by prevailing common law forces—makes 
them all too susceptible to the anchor effect. As discussed below 
through the lens of Louisiana’s bijural experience, this ever-so-
subtle effect can lead to the enactment of a scheme of laws that 
attempts to fulfill two goals—a preservation of tradition and a 
desire to create a more clear and competitive body of laws—but in 
the end achieve neither. 
B. The Louisiana Bijural Experience 
A great deal of Louisiana law is derived from the civil law 
tradition,60 whereas the rest of the United States follows that of the 
common law.61 Because of its unique status, legal scholars have 
often declared that Louisiana is a civil law island floating in a sea 
of common law jurisdictions—a mixed jurisdiction.62 Going back 
to its early history, Louisiana adopted and was chiefly influenced 
by the French (and some argue equally so by the Spanish) civil 
law.63 In fact, many provisions of today’s Louisiana Civil Code 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. at 81–82. 
 58. Id. at 85–86. 
 59. Id. at 26–27. 
 60. See A.N. YIANNOPOLOUS, PROPERTY § 6, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE 10–11 (4th ed. 2001). 
 61. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (Steve Sheppard ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 4th ed. 
2010). 
 62. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 80–81. 
 63. See generally Rodolfo Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, Facts 
and Speculation: A Rejoinder, 46 TUL. L. REV. 628, 634 (1972) [hereinafter 
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still resemble complimentary provisions in France’s Code Civil as 
enacted in 1804.64 Louisiana scholars view its legal system as 
unique and as something to be treasured, rather than as mere relics 
of the past.65  
At various times in its long history, Louisiana has waged 
several long, hard-fought battles to maintain its civilian identity.66 
In 1803 when the United States first took possession of the 
Louisiana territory, the then-existing laws consisted of French and 
Spanish laws and legal customs that were derived from the 
territory’s former colonial rulers.67 At the time of annexation by 
the United States, the territorial Superior Court—in order to 
                                                                                                             
 
Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of 1808]; Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil 
Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 7–8 
(1971) [hereinafter Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808]; Robert A. Pascal, 
Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 
603, 605–07 (1972); Joseph M. Sweeney, Tournament of Scholars Over the 
Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, 46 TUL. L. REV. 585, 590–91 (1972). 
Although not entirely resolved, academic fervor over this dispute has faded from 
view. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Louisiana Law: Critical 
Appraisal of a Controversy, in LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE 97, 100–03 
(Haas, ed. 1983) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Law]; Shael 
Herman, The Contribution of Roman Law to the Jurisprudence of Antebellum 
Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REV. 257, 264–65 (1996); Harriet Spiller Daggett et al., A 
Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 
12, 40 (1937); see also Melissa T. Lonegrass, The Anomalous Interaction of 
Code and Statute—Lessor’s Warranty and Statutory Waiver, 88 TUL. L. REV. 
423 (2014). 
 64. See, e.g., Pitre v. Pitre, 183 So. 2d 307, 309 (La. 1966) (noting that 
“Article 891 of the French Civil Code . . . is the same as our Article 1408”); see 
also Placid Oil Co. v. Taylor, 325 So. 2d 313, 316 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (“The 
provisions of LSA-C.C. art. 2190 are substantially the same as those contained 
in Article 1273 of the French Civil Code.”); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Creation of 
Servitudes by Prescription and Destination of Owners, 43 LA. L. REV. 57, 63 
(1982) (“Article 728 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 was the same as article 
52 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 and article 689 of the French Civil 
Code.”). 
 65. See generally A.N. Yiannopoulos, On the Bicentenary of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court: Chronicle of the Creation of a Unique and Beautiful Legal 
Tradition, 74 LA. L. REV. 649 (2014) (extolling the virtues of the civil law); see 
also John H. Tucker, Jr., The Jurisconsult, 45 LA. L. REV. 1011 (1985) (“Tucker 
initiated a movement at Louisiana State University for the creation of an 
Institute devoted to legal research and law revision. In his words, the civil law 
was historically a body of law expounded by jurisconsults, a university made 
law, and a hope for the preservation and expansion of the Louisiana legal 
tradition depended on the development of an indigenous legal scholarship.”).  
 66. PALMER, supra note 15, at 260–64. 
 67. A great deal of debate exists regarding whether it was actually French or 
Spanish law that predominated the law of Louisiana at the time. See generally 
Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Law, supra note 63, at 96, 100–03. 
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solidify the civil law’s continued use despite the state’s new 
American masters—stated that “Roman, Spanish, and French civil 
law would be enforced as the customary law of the territory in all 
cases.”68 This was followed by an act of the Louisiana Legislative 
Council and House of Representatives that affirmed the sentiments 
of the Superior Court in upholding Louisiana’s existing civil law 
institutions.69  
However, Governor W.C.C. Claiborne, the new congressionally 
appointed chief executive of Louisiana, vetoed the legislative act, 
declaring that the power to determine whether the civil law 
continued to be in effect in Louisiana was solely the prerogative of 
the United States Congress.70 In response to this affront, the 
Louisiana Legislature resigned en masse in protest, which was then 
followed by a manifesto, signed by the president of the Legislative 
Council and published in the New Orleans newspaper, decrying the 
governor’s veto.71 This manifesto affirmed Louisiana’s strong 
commitment to the civil law and expressed an aversion to American 
interference in an area that “embodied their cultural heritage and 
assured the stability of social and economic relations.”72 The 
Legislature then reconvened on June 7, 1806, and commissioned the 
esteemed lawyers and legal scholars James Brown and Louis Moreau-
Lislet to draft a formal civil code for the Louisiana territory.73 
Acknowledging the strong sentiment of the people of Louisiana in 
retaining their cherished civil law tradition, Governor Claiborne 
acquiesced.74 Years later, looking back on this early struggle in his 
governorship over Louisiana, Claiborne stated:  
We ought to recollect . . . the peculiar circumstances in 
which Louisiana is placed, nor ought we to be unmindful of 
                                                                                                             
 68. Raphael J. Rabalais, The Influence of Spanish Laws and Treatises on the 
Jurisprudence of Louisiana: 1762-1828, 42 LA. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (1982) 
(citing G. DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL 
TRADITIONS 132 (1975)).  
 69. SHAEL HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A EUROPEAN LEGACY 
FOR THE UNITED STATES 29 (1993). 
 70. See id.  
 71. See id. at 30.  
 72. Id. at 29 (emphasis added). A portion of the manifesto states:  
We certainly do not attempt to draw any parallel between the civil law 
and the common law; but, in short, the wisdom of the civil law is 
recognized by all Europe; and this law is the one which nineteen-
twentieths of the population of Louisiana know and are accustomed to 
from childhood, of which law they would not see themselves deprived 
without falling into despair.  
Id.  
 73. See Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Law, supra note 63, at 91. 
 74. See id. 
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the respect due the sentiments and wishes of the ancient 
Louisianans who compose so great a proportion of the 
population. Educated in a belief in the excellences of the 
civil law, the Louisianans have hitherto been unwilling to 
part with them . . . .75 
Then, at the turn of the 20th century, a young Louisiana law 
professor declared that, in essence, Louisiana had become simply 
another common law jurisdiction.76 This statement set off a 
firestorm of scholarly debate and rebuttals that further solidified 
Louisiana’s commitment to the civil law.77 From that time up to 
present day, Louisiana has continued to show its commitment to 
the civilian cause through the establishment of various societies 
and organizations formed to specifically explore and celebrate the 
civil law tradition.78 Even an entire agency of state government is 
dedicated to preserving and studying this distinctive aspect of 
Louisiana.79 To Louisianans, as with all mixed jurisdictions, the 
civil law heritage holds a special place, both in its past and in its 
present, in what makes the jurisdiction so distinctive and unique.  
However, although appreciating and preserving the past is 
praiseworthy, Louisiana’s leaders—like those of all mixed 
jurisdictions—also recognize that in order for the state to have an 
economy that can compete on the regional and national level, as 
well as attract individuals to settle and make a life within its borders, 
new ideas and reforms are necessary. The law as it existed in 19th 
century France does not always serve the same utility today as it 
                                                                                                             
 75. HERMAN, supra note 69, at 31 (citing letter from Governor W.C.C. 
Claiborne to Judge J. White (Oct. 11, 1808)), in IV OFFICIAL LETTER BOOKS OF 
W.C.C. CLAIBORNE (Dunbar Rowland ed., 1917). 
 76. See Gordon Ireland, Louisiana’s Legal System Reappraised, 11 TUL. L. 
REV. 585, 596 (1937). 
 77. See Daggett et al., supra note 63. A further vibrant scholarly debate 
arose in the 1970s that consisted chiefly of trying to ascertain exactly which 
civil law sources (i.e., French law or Spanish law) had the greatest influence on 
Brown and Moreau-Listlet when drafting their digest of civil laws. See Batiza, 
Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, supra note 63; Batiza, The Louisiana Civil 
Code of 1808, supra note 63; Pascal, supra note 63; Sweeney, supra note 63.  
 78. See, e.g., Albert Tate, Jr., Tucker and the Society of Bartolus, 45 LA. L. 
REV. 1017 (1985) (describing Louisiana’s private society of lawyers, judges, 
and law professors dedicated to providing an ongoing scholarly discourse on the 
civil law); William E. Crawford & Cordell H. Haymon, Louisiana State Law 
Institute Recognizes 70-Year Milestone: Origin, History and Accomplishments, 
56 LA. B.J. 85 (2008) (describing the legislative agency charged with being the 
official law reform arm of the state of Louisiana, as well as highlighting its 
various accomplishments). 
 79. See generally William E. Crawford, The Louisiana State Law Institute—
History and Progress, 45 LA. L. REV. 1077 (1985). 
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did long ago.80 Louisiana, although once predominantly rural and 
agrarian, has changed and evolved over time.81 United States 
industry, shipping, energy, and various commercial enterprises 
occupy a prominent place in the state’s economy.82 These 
industries and the ways in which they do business require a 
sophisticated and complex legal system in order to facilitate an 
efficient and successful marketplace. Louisiana’s economy no 
longer stretches merely up and down the Mississippi River and 
across the various parishes of the state. Rather, Louisiana operates in 
a much larger marketplace where goods are bought and sold and 
transactions are consummated globally across borders and 
boundaries. Similarly, travel between the states has greatly increased 
since Louisiana’s early days, resulting in many residents of the state 
having migrated from areas far across the country.83  
As a result of the ever-changing and expanding national 
economy and the inherent desire to meet the expectations of modern 
American society, Louisiana law, like that of many mixed 
jurisdictions, has been forced to venture off its civil law island and 
adapt to the world around it. Concepts and institutions from other 
states and other countries have been enacted and incorporated—both 
by Louisiana’s Legislature and its courts—in order to meet the 
needs of a robust and dynamic world. Louisiana has, at various 
times, dipped its toes into the common law sea and slowly but surely 
co-opted or directly enacted various common law concepts and 
uniform statutory provisions into its own legal system.84 
And yet, Louisiana’s civil law has not been jettisoned altogether. 
As a state so deeply immersed in culture and history—and having 
                                                                                                             
 80. See, e.g., Christopher K. Odinet, Comment, Laying to Rest an Ancien 
Régime: Antiquated Institutions in Louisiana Civil Law and Their Incompatibility 
with Modern Public Policies, 70 LA. L. REV. 1367 (2010). 
 81. See id. at 1368.  
 82. See, e.g., LOREN C. SCOTT, THE ENERGY SECTOR: STILL A GIANT 
ECONOMIC ENGINE FOR THE LOUISIANA ECONOMY (2011); STEPHEN FOWLER, EUNJI 
KIM, MONICA KINCHEN & MITCHELL ARONOV, LOUISIANA MANUFACTURERS 
REGISTER (2013). 
 83. Louisiana–Migration, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/states 
/Louisiana-Migration.html, archived at http://perma.cc/66A6-DLB9 (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2015); Florence M. Jumonville, “Formerly the Property of a Lawyer”—
Books That Shaped Louisiana Law, 24 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 161 (2009) (citing 
SIDNEY LOUIS VILLERE, THE CANARY ISLAND MIGRATION TO LOUISIANA, 1778-
1783 (New Orleans: Genealogical Research Soc’y of New Orleans, 1971)). 
 84. See Eicke v. Eicke, 399 So. 2d 1231, 1234 (La. Ct. App. 1981) 
(discussing Louisiana’s adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Law); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3831–3850 (1960) (comprising 
Louisiana’s enactment of the Uniform Law for the Simplification of Fiduciary 
Transfers); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:151–182 (1997) (comprising Louisiana’s 
enactment of the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act). 
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fought so vigorously in the past to preserve its legal heritage—such 
a move would be abhorrent to Louisiana’s sense of pride and 
identity. Instead, existing civil law institutions will often remain in 
place, despite the enactment of new, foreign provisions.85 This is 
true even when the subject matter of the new law and that of the 
existing civil law institution occupy the same or similar spaces.86 
Remedies will sometimes be created that are familiar to national and 
mainstream interests, even when functionally equivalent rights 
already exist under the state’s civil law scheme.87 Even worse, 
prevailing doctrines under the common law will be grafted into 
Louisiana jurisprudence, even when they conflict or cause friction 
and confusion with existing civilian concepts.88  
Because of this anchor effect—the reaching into the common 
law waters in order to better compete on the national stage, while 
still keeping camp on the civil law island in order to preserve a 
sense of tradition and identity—many areas of Louisiana law have 
actually become less competitive, less mainstream, and less in line 
with modern expectations.89 Lawyers and courts dealing with these 
conflicting and overlapping institutions are often left confused as 
to which concept is more applicable or should govern, and the 
result can be a conflation of different doctrines and policies.90 The 
end result is anything but a more competitive, clear, and uniform 
legal system and does a great injustice to the very civil law 
tradition it seeks to honor.91 Through an understanding of these 
various Louisiana concepts and legal institutions discussed in the 
following sections and their interplay, one gains a better 
recognition and understanding of the anchor effect and its negative 
consequences in all mixed jurisdictions.  
II. ANCHORING THE LAW OF WARRANTIES OF CONDITION 
Regardless of the jurisdiction, a primary goal in contracting for 
the sale of property is for the buyer to know exactly what he is 
purchasing and for the seller to be clear as to exactly what he is 
selling.92 The buyer has certain expectations and makes certain 
assumptions about the property that motivates and furthers his 
desire to consummate the deal. Likewise, the seller has certain 
                                                                                                             
 85. See, e.g., infra Part II.A. 
 86. See infra Parts II–III. 
 87. See infra Parts II–III. 
 88. See supra Parts I–III. 
 89. See infra Parts II–III. 
 90. See infra Parts II–III. 
 91. See infra Parts II–III. 
 92. UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 100 (2000). 
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impressions and understandings about what the buyer believes he 
is receiving and what exactly the seller believes he is offering. 
Clarity on these points is, in great part, what lends consistency to 
the marketplace and makes a stable economy possible.93 
In Louisiana, like many mixed jurisdictions, these important 
goals are achieved, in part, through implied warranties of 
condition.94 In essence, these warranties consist of certain promises 
that the seller makes to the purchaser regarding the condition of the 
property.95 These include warranting that the property is free of 
certain defects and faults, as well as the promise that the property 
is fit for use.96 In the event the property fails to meet these 
conditions, the law allows the purchaser to, among other things, 
rescind the sale if certain conditions are met.97 Under Louisiana’s 
civil law—unlike in the common law tradition—warranties of 
condition arise automatically in each and every sale of property, 
regardless of whether the parties expressly agree to them.98 They 
are implied and can only be disposed of through an express and 
knowing waiver.99 
Throughout Louisiana’s history, the principal warranty of 
condition in the sale of property has been the warranty against 
redhibitory defects.100 This institution is derived from the Roman 
and French civil law tradition, and its precepts continue in 
Louisiana’s law of sales today.101 However, in 1993, as part of an 
ongoing effort to incorporate more national concepts from the 
Uniform Commercial Code’s Article 2 provisions on the law of 
sales of goods (movables), the Louisiana Legislature waded into the 
waters of its neighboring states and adopted another warranty of 
condition—the warranty of fitness.102 This institution is different 
                                                                                                             
 93. Id. See generally 18 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 52:81 (4th ed.) 
(describing the use of legal terms-of-art in commercial transactions under the 
Uniform Commercial Code and at common law, and the effects they have on the 
relationship and rights of the parties). 
 94. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (2015) (warranty against redhibitory 
defects).  
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2531 (2015) (providing for the liability 
of sellers beyond rescission). 
 98. See, e.g., Smith v. Sonnier, 110 So. 3d 1285 (La. Ct. App. 2013); see 
also Neighborhood Shipping, Inc. v. A & B Indus., No. 2010 CA 1651, 2011 
WL 1941420 (La. Ct. App. May 6, 2011). 
 99. See, e.g., Lirette v. Ledet, No. 2011 CA 1060, 2012 WL 1345354 (La. 
Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2012); Sabbath v. Martin, No. 44,862-CA, 2009 WL 3449096, 
at *2–3 (La. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2009). 
 100. See Spurgeon, supra note 11. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 cmt. a (2015). 
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from redhibition, but it arises under many similar fact patterns, 
thereby creating frequent overlap, confusion, and conflict between 
the two devices.103 Unfortunately, the interplay between redhibition 
and fitness has contributed in great part to the confusion of both in-
state and out-of-state lawyers and parties when engaging in 
transactions in Louisiana. 
A. The Civil Law Doctrine: Warranty Against Redhibitory Defects 
The ancient civilian warranty against redhibitory defects grants 
a purchaser the right to seek the rescission of a sale when the 
property sold contains a hidden defect.104 The rights, requirements, 
and procedures for redhibition arise under Louisiana Civil Code 
articles 2520 through 2548.105 The primary purposes behind the 
warranty is to protect unknowing purchasers against dishonest 
sellers, to restore the parties to their positions prior to the sale, and, 
when possible, to uphold the stability and sanctity of the 
transaction.106  
A vice or defect in property will give rise to an action in 
redhibition if it meets certain narrowly drawn requirements.107 
These include the requirement that the defect render the thing 
either completely useless or so inconvenient that the purchaser 
would never have bought the thing had he known of the defect.108 
A redhibition claim can also arise when, although the thing is not 
entirely useless or inconvenient, the defect causes the value of the 
thing to be less than what was originally paid.109 Depending on the 
category of the defect, the court can either undo the sale 
completely or it can order a reduction of the purchase price.110  
                                                                                                             
 103. See George L. Bibe, Redhibition and Implied Warranties Under the 
1993 Revision of the Louisiana Law of Sales, 54 LA. L. REV. 125, 141 (1993). 
 104. See TITLE, supra note 11, § 10:64; TOOLEY-KNOBLETT supra note 11, § 
11:1. 
 105. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520–2548 (2015). The articles on redhibition 
in the Civil Code apply to both immovables and movables. See Guenin v. R.M. 
Homes, Inc., 424 So. 2d 485, 487 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
 106. See Bruce V. Schewe & Debra J. Hale, Obligations, 53 LA. L. REV. 917, 
919 (1993); Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1231–32. 
 107. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (2015). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id.; see also Di Pietro v. Le Blanc, 68 So. 2d 156 (La. Ct. App. 
1953); Russell v. Bartlett, 139 So. 2d 770 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Glynn v. 
Delcuze, 149 So. 2d 667 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Busenlener v. Peck, 316 So. 2d 27 
(La. Ct. App. 1975); Verlander v. Hoffer, 351 So. 2d 229 (La. Ct. App. 1977); 
Garrett v. Gayle, 405 So. 2d 622 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Estopinal v. Bourshie, 420 
So. 2d 749 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
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It should be noted that an essential element of redhibition is 
that the defect must exist at the time the property is purchased, and 
such a defect must not be readily discoverable by the purchaser.111 
In other words, the defect must be hidden and latent with respect to 
the purchaser at the time of the purchase, only rising to the surface 
at a later date.112 Redhibition’s rules even allow for an opportunity 
to repair and cure a defect when the seller acted in good faith.113 
These rules exhibit a strong preference in the law of redhibition to, 
when possible, maintain the integrity of the transaction rather than 
order it undone. 
1. History of the Doctrine 
In addition to these laudable qualities, redhibition holds a 
singular place on the civil law island due to its ancient roots.114 
And arguably, it is this ancient status that has made the institution 
so untouchable and, consequently, infrequently amended.  
Under Roman law, the first implied warranty of condition arose 
at the initiative of those public officials who were charged with 
regulating the marketplace.115 Sellers were required to promise 
their buyers that the thing being sold was free of defects.116 If a 
defect did arise, regardless of whether the seller had knowledge of 
it, the buyer had an action to undo the sale.117 Emperor Justinian, 
in promulgating his Digest, incorporated the Roman law 
warranty—understood at the time as a type of “aedilician” concept, 
or rule created by marketplace regulators—as an extension of the 
general duty of parties to act in good faith in their dealings with 
one another, but the emperor also made some curtailments.118 For 
instance, the action was not available if the buyer knew of the 
defect.119 Thus, the defect had to be hidden and not readily 
discoverable at the time of the sale.120 Further, the remedy of 
quanti minoris (i.e., a reduction of the purchase price) was 
added.121 Justinian’s revised version of redhibition sought to better 
                                                                                                             
 111. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2521, 2530 (2015). 
 112. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2530 (2015).  
 113. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2531 (2015); see also Pratt v. Himel Marine, 
Inc., 823 So. 2d 394 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 114. See Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1230. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. at 1229. 
 117. Id. at 1230–31. 
 118. Id. at 1231. 
 119. David E. Murray, Implied Warranty Against Latent Defects: A Historical 
Comparative Law Study, 21 LA. L. REV. 586, 594 (1961). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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balance the equities between the parties by allowing the action 
only when the purchaser did not know of the vice in the property. 
This was meant to avoid situations where cunning purchasers 
would bring claims frivolously for defects for which they were 
always aware.122 
When the French Civil Code was developed in the early 1800s, 
much of its concepts were rooted in the ancient Roman law, as well 
as in Justinian’s Digest.123 As such, the law of redhibition was 
incorporated into the French code.124 The stated purpose of the 
French law of redhibition was “to protect buyers and the general 
public against dangers inherent in all products.”125 Like the Romans, 
the French sought to impose a general, blanket warranty that would 
automatically arise in all sales in order to further the goal of providing 
stability, fairness, and predictability in the marketplace.126 Following 
Justinian’s lead, these French rules were clear, concise, and narrowly 
tailored so as to apprise all parties as to the safeguards and pitfalls of 
contracting for the sale of property.127  
2. Louisiana’s Incorporation of the Doctrine 
The law of redhibition came to Louisiana through its early 
incorporation into the Louisiana Civil Code.128 In a state whose 
early history was intertwined with the civil law traditions of France 
and Spain, the incorporation of redhibition was natural to 
Louisiana’s early civil code drafters who found more comfort in 
the traditions of the civil law, rather than the more foreign 
institutions of the Anglo-American system prevalent throughout 
the rest of the United States.129 As in its prior iterations, the 
Louisiana version of redhibition required that the vice or defect in 
the property be non-apparent, and that both rescission of the sale 
and reduction of the purchase price be the possible remedies.130  
As might be expected, commercial and consumer transactions 
have, over time, taken on greater complexity. And following the 
                                                                                                             
 122. See generally id. 
 123. See Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1231; PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN 
EUROPEAN HISTORY 114–15 (1999). 
 124. See Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1231. 
 125. Id. at 1231–32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Philippe 
Malinvaud, Redhibitory Defects and Their Importance in Contemporary Society, 
50 TUL. L. REV. 517, 518 (1976)).  
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1232. Herman, supra note 63, at 266. 
 129. See Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1232. 
 130. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520–2548 (2015). 
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natural progression of all mixed jurisdictions, Louisiana has 
variously added its own nuances to redhibition in an effort to 
modernize and provide more even-handedness and predictability to 
this institution.131 For instance, certain sellers, such as manufacturers, 
are deemed to have knowledge of a defect, regardless of whether they 
actually do, because of their unique position as the creator of the thing 
being sold.132 Although many scholars note that this rule had been 
adopted by courts for many years prior to its legislative enactment, 
one could nevertheless easily surmise that its direct codification had 
something to do with the proliferation of large-scale manufacturing in 
the United States and the resulting products liability litigation.133 In 
order to keep pace with these national trends, Louisiana adopted a 
rule which essentially imputed knowledge of a product’s defects to 
the manufacturer for purposes of redhibition, since the one who 
created the thing was logically in the best position to know of any 
defects in it.134  
Despite these changes, however, modifications to redhibition 
have been modest.135 Such a dedication to longstanding legal 
institutions is a mark of the commitment to history and tradition 
embodied in all mixed jurisdictions.136 In fact, aside from a handful 
of updating amendments, most of the articles on redhibition in 
Louisiana are similar to those contained in the Louisiana Civil 
Code going back to 1870.137 
B. The Common Law Doctrine: Warranty of Fitness 
In addition to the traditional civilian warranty against redhibitory 
defects, a buyer may also sue his seller for a breach of the common 
law-based—and relatively new to Louisiana—warranty of fitness.138 
Under this warranty the seller has a general responsibility to ensure 
that the thing he sells is fit for its intended use.139 Generally, the 
“intended” use means its ordinary and customary use.140 However, if 
the seller has reason to know of the particular use of the thing by 
                                                                                                             
 131. See id. 
 132. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2545 cmt. b (2015). 
 133. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, § 11:16. 
 134. For a discussion of the history of products liability in Louisiana, see 
WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, TORT LAW § 16:1, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE (2d ed. 2012). 
 135. See Bibe, supra note 103. 
 136. See Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1230–37. 
 137. See id. at 1234. 
 138. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015). 
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 140. See TITLE, supra note 11, at § 10:63. 
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the buyer and such knowledge is accompanied by a reliance on the 
seller’s skill and expertise, then the seller is charged with the 
enhanced responsibility of ensuring that the thing the buyer receives 
meets those particular needs and uses.141 It is notable that, unlike the 
more narrowly drawn institute of redhibition, this warranty is very 
broad and expansive.142 It lacks the many limitations of redhibition, 
and the breach of the warranty of fitness falls under the more general 
rules for the breach of an obligation by a party as articulated in the 
Civil Code’s articles of conventional obligations (contracts).143 
1. History of the Doctrine 
The inherent pull toward incorporating this common law 
concept was felt in Louisiana long before its eventual enactment 
into the Louisiana Civil Code. Although the warranty of fitness 
was not formally adopted until 1993, Louisiana courts had 
arguably made general allusions to the existence of the warranty of 
fitness in some form or fashion since the early 1900s.144 In the first 
case touching on the warranty of fitness, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court stated “we are only announcing a principle which no one 
denies when we state that the vendor, unless warranty is waived, 
warrants the thing sold as fit for the particular purpose for which it 
was bought.”145 Further, other cases appeared to suggest that the 
existence of the common law warranty of fitness was intertwined 
with redhibition’s precepts.146 Some courts suggested that the 
warranty was part and parcel of redhibition, while others tended to 
indirectly acknowledge that it was a separate warranty derived 
from the spirit of redhibition.147 For instance, the court in the 1972 
case of Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of 
North America, Inc. tacitly acknowledged the existence of a 
general warranty of fitness, even though the actual UCC statute 
                                                                                                             
 141. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See Bibe, supra note 103, at 138 (describing the open-ended remedies 
provided by the obligations articles of the Civil Code that are available to a 
plaintiff under a warranty of fitness claim). 
 144. See generally Fee v. Sentell, 28 So. 279 (La. 1900) (“We will not fall 
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would not be legislatively enacted until 21 years later.148 In 
essence, the court was talking about the articles on redhibition, but 
utilizing different terminology and characteristics.149 This off-
handed use of language, some redhibition and some fitness, added 
even more confusion as to the existence and applicability of the 
warranty of fitness.150  
A few years later in 1974, the Louisiana Supreme Court would 
again suggest in two different cases that the warranty of fitness 
existed either apart from or in tandem with redhibition.151 In the 
first case, Rey v. Cuccia, the court went through the traditional 
redhibition analysis, but then stated “[h]owever, if [the buyer] 
proves that the product purchased is not reasonably fit for its 
intended use, it is sufficient that he prove that the object is thus 
defective, without his being required to prove the exact or 
underlying cause for its malfunction.”152 Later that same year, the 
court stated in Hob’s Refrigeration and Air Conditioning, Inc. v. 
Poche that “[i]n Louisiana sales, the seller is bound by an implied 
warranty that the thing sold is free of hidden defects and is 
reasonably fit for the product’s intended use.”153 In neither case 
did the court make an ultimate and clear holding regarding the 
warranty’s independent existence, preferring instead to make 
general statements regarding intended use alongside traditional 
declarations about redhibition.154 This mingling of the concepts 
suggests that the court was trying to use equitable theories—such 
as those which originally gave birth to the common law warranty 
of fitness—to expand the scope of redhibition, although it is 
arguable from the facts of each whether such an expansion would 
have even been necessary in order for the court to achieve the same 
results.155  
In Media Production, Rey, and Hob’s, the court was seemingly 
reaching outside the normal and narrow parameters of redhibition 
to incorporate broader principles of recovery—much akin to those 
available to courts at common law.156 Initially, the common law 
                                                                                                             
 148. Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 
Inc., 262 So. 2d 377 (La. 1972). 
 149. Id. 
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 155. Rey, 298 So. 2d 840; Poche, 304 So. 2d 326. 
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did not recognize an implied warranty in the sale of property.157 
However, in order to promote fairness and equity, courts gradually 
began to recognize certain warranties that were inherent in the sale 
of property.158 Specifically, in early common law, the rule of 
caveat emptor (buyer beware) reigned supreme but was gradually 
curtailed in the early 1800s by an action rooted in a hybrid of tort 
and contract.159 Unlike jurists in the civil law tradition, courts of 
equity at common law were at liberty to fashion remedies that 
departed from those explicitly set forth in legislation.160 Similarly, 
Louisiana courts dealing with the early concept of the warranty of 
fitness can also be characterized as trying to emulate their common 
law cousins by providing a broader array of remedies in the 
context of sales.161 
                                                                                                             
 
order to fashion remedies when justice so dictates (a hallmark of the English 
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making outside the confines of legislation. See Bonneau v. Blalock, 484 So. 2d 
275, 276 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (“The concept of equity as provided by Article 21 
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 157. See Spurgeon, supra note 11. 
 158. See id. 
 159. Id. at 1232. 
 160. See generally Austin Abbot, The Co-Operation of “Law” and 
“Equity;” and the Engrafting of Equitable Remedies Upon Common-Law 
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 161. See, e.g., Falk v. Like Motor Co., Inc., 112 So. 2d 683 (La. 1959); 
Radalec Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 81 So. 2d 830 (La. 1955); Jackson v. 
Bread Motor Co., 120 So. 478 (La. 1929); Crawford v. Abott Auto. Co., 101 So. 
871 (La. 1924); Craig v. Burch, 228 So. 2d 723 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Cosey v. 
Cambre, 204 So. 2d 97 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Bartolotta v. Gambino, 78 So. 2d 
208 (La. Ct. App. 1955). 
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2. Louisiana’s Incorporation of the Doctrine  
In 1993, the Louisiana Legislature expressly recognized the often 
confused and misidentified warranty of fitness by incorporating its 
codified version from the Uniform Commercial Code directly into 
the Louisiana Civil Code.162 To further add to its shiftless history, 
the new article was placed in the chapter on redhibition, and the 
accompanying comments disclaimed any connection to the early 
common law concept of the warranty of fitness—a concept that 
Louisiana courts had nonetheless been vaguely referring to since 
the early 1900s.163 The new article was simple and succinct. Rather 
than containing the intricate rules, requirements, and exclusive 
remedies available under redhibition, the new Louisiana Civil 
Code article 2524 was short and open-ended. If the warranty of 
fitness is breached, the remedies are those available under the 
general law of obligations (contracts), without limitation.164  
Unlike redhibition, with its narrow possibilities in the way of 
damages, reduction of the purchase price, or rescission of the sale, 
the new warranty of fitness left open the possibility of a varied 
bundle of remedies.165 In the comments to the article, the drafters 
explicitly noted that “[t]he Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized 
the existence of [the warranty of fitness] although, in most 
instances, it has been confused with the warranty against 
redhibitory vices.”166  
Although the Louisiana State Law Institute declared that the 
introduction of Louisiana Civil Code article 2524 did not change 
the law, the subsequent jurisprudence would suggest otherwise.167 
Whereas before 1993 the warranty only existed in jurisprudence—
as shown in Media Consultants, Hob’s, and Rey—as either a 
jurisprudential gloss on redhibition or as a casual independent 
statement of the court on the responsibilities of a seller,168 the 
                                                                                                             
 162. See Bibe, supra note 103, at 142. Under UCC Article 2, the warranty of 
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 165. See id. 
 166. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 cmt. a (2015). 
 167. See id. 
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enactment of the new article specifically codified the new 
warranty.169 Taken in context, the introduction of the warranty of 
fitness was part of a much larger “comprehensive revision of Civil 
Code Articles on Sales.”170 The goal of this revision—so common 
among legal reformers in mixed jurisdictions—was to update and 
modernize the law of sales in Louisiana, which included the 
adoption of some, but not nearly all, aspects of the nationally 
prevalent Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.171  
In general, the purpose of the UCC was to engender 
standardization by creating a model, streamlined set of laws to govern 
commercial transactions.172 Almost every state in the United States 
has adopted Article 2, which deals with the sale of goods, except for 
Louisiana.173 This was due in large part to the belief that the common 
law concepts in Article 2 were incompatible with Louisiana’s larger 
civil law scheme.174 Nonetheless, many provisions of Louisiana’s law 
of sales were changed and select concepts from Article 2 were 
introduced, including the warranty of fitness found in sections 2-314 
and 2-315 of Article 2.175 Such, it can be argued, was the result of 
Louisiana’s desire to enhance its commercial competitiveness by 
enacting laws which are common to other states, while nonetheless 
maintaining its unique legal institutions.176 However, in this 
instance, and judging from the facts of the cases described above, 
there is little reason to believe that the same results could not have 
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James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on 
Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 
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flowed from merely utilizing redihibition, without making references 
to fitness.177 In this way, Louisiana law was not deficient such that the 
UCC’s version of the warranty of fitness was necessary in order to 
meet Louisiana’s commercial goals. Rather, it appears to have been 
gratuitously enacted as part of a larger, and perhaps somewhat 
blinded, desire to make the law of sales in this particular area look 
more like the laws of the UCC in other states. It is easy to see how 
similar motivations to align the law of a particular locale with 
prevailing common law concepts could be similarly present in the 
law reform process of other mixed jurisdictions. 
C. Conflict Between the Two: Overlap and Confusion 
What Louisiana has been left with are two warranties, 
extremely similar in purpose and applicability, but inherently 
different in structure and complexity. The incorporation of the 
warranty of fitness was part of an effort to update and enhance an 
area of the law that was otherwise viewed as outmoded and not in 
tune with the prevailing customs and practices of the commercial 
world.178 At the time, Louisiana’s law of sales represented a 
traditional stronghold of the civil law. But as an island in a sea of 
common law states, Louisiana determined that adopting more 
mainstream institutions would further the state’s economic 
goals.179  
Not eager to be completely submerged under the common law 
waters, Louisiana chose to moor itself to the ancient civil law 
institution of redhibition.180 Since redhibition had long been a part 
of Louisiana law, stretching back into French and Roman times, it 
had a strong and direct connection to Louisiana’s roots, and thus 
served as a natural object of the state’s affinity for maintaining its 
traditional and historical legal institutions.181  
In light of the common law’s gradual retreat from caveat 
emptor, one might say that redhibition was ahead of its time in that 
it provided an implied warranty before the common law’s hybrid 
tort and contract warranty principles began to arise, and certainly 
well ahead of the UCC’s warranty of fitness.182 Originally, the law 
of sales of personal property at common law adhered to the general 
principle that the “buyer should beware” in making his purchases, 
                                                                                                             
 177. See supra Part II.A and accompanying discussion. 
 178. See Bibe, supra note 103, at 138–44. 
 179. See generally id. 
 180. See id. at 126. 
 181. See generally id. 
 182. See id.  
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since any defects or problems with the object of his purchase 
would be born solely by him.183 But over time the application of 
this strict rule caused harsh results, and courts began to find an 
equitable remedy through a combination of tort and contract 
theories—thus giving birth to the first form of the warranty of 
fitness.184  
Redhibition, on the other hand, has been around since early 
Roman law in a much more sophisticated and direct fashion than 
the judge-made contract-tort warranty at common law.185 Some 
scholars, such as Professor James Gordley, have even suggested 
that the precepts of many common law contract theories—of which 
the warranty of fitness is one—were in fact originally taken from 
the much more ancient and established civil law tradition—thereby 
suggesting that redhibition actually inspired common law courts to 
create the warranty of fitness.186 However, redhibition is structured 
so as to balance the rights of the buyer and seller by providing 
different rules to cover different transactions. But, whatever its 
merits, the way in which redhibition was maintained alongside the 
incorporation of the warranty of fitness serves as a major contributor 
to the anchor effect in this mixed jurisdiction. Redhibition is meant 
to protect the marketplace from corrupt sellers in certain narrowly 
defined situations where the law deems the purchaser to be in such a 
situation as to be unable to make an informed decision about his 
purchase.187 The institution is narrowly defined so as to only 
contemplate and provide a remedy for specific situations.188  
By the same token, redhibition seeks to balance the rights of the 
parties by allowing the seller the opportunity to repair a defect if he, at 
the time of the sale, did not know of it.189 Thus, the law of redhibition 
does not seek to rescind or modify transactions indiscriminately, but 
rather assumes that if the defect or vice were removed, the purchaser 
would nonetheless still have purchased the thing.190 The virtue of this 
mainstay of the civil law island is seen through its temperate and 
balanced approach to private party conflict.  
                                                                                                             
 183. See Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE 
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 184. See id. 
 185. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT, supra note 11, § 11:1. 
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 187. Spurgeon, supra note 11, at 1229–30. 
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On the other hand, the warranty of fitness is much broader.191 
In redhibition, a good faith seller has the ability to repair, and, if he 
cannot, he must return the purchase price and any incidental 
expenses of the transactions.192 Only if the seller is in bad faith 
(i.e., knew of the defect at the time he sold it) do remedies for 
damages arise.193 Under the warranty of fitness, however, the 
possibilities are much wider.194 First, the concept of good or bad 
faith does not matter in such a definitive way.195 If there is a breach 
of the warranty, then the rules on conventional obligations 
automatically apply.196 Under these rules, damages are always a 
possibility, as is the dissolution of the sale.197 Hence, the power 
lies in the hands of the petitioning purchaser, rather than with an 
equitable and balanced statutory framework.198  
It is also noted that redhibition, in the case of bad faith sellers, 
also affords the opportunity to recover attorney’s fees, while the 
general rules on conventional obligations do not allow for such 
automatic recovery.199 The rationale for the difference in the rule 
seems unintelligible since the culpability of a bad faith seller in 
redhibition and a bad faith seller in the warranty of fitness would 
both seem to rise to the same or at least a substantially similar level 
of offense. Further, nothing in the Civil Code suggests that the two 
actions cannot be brought at the same time for the same sale.200 
Thus, it is possible for an aggrieved purchaser to sue under both 
redhibition and the warranty of fitness.201 If the court finds that the 
thing was not defective at the time of the sale, the purchaser may 
still prevail by showing that it was not fit for its ordinary use.202 
Still, if it can be proved that the seller knew of the purchaser’s 
specific need for the thing then the purchaser may prevail by 
showing that the thing was not fit for his particular need.203 
Conversely, a good faith seller would benefit more by arguing that 
                                                                                                             
 191. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015). 
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 193. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2545 (2015). 
 194. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015). 
 195. See id. It should be noted, however, that the Louisiana Law of 
Obligations also provides a general duty of good faith in contracts for all parties. 
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2015); see also Gibbs Const. Co., v. Thomas, 500 
So. 2d 764, 768 (La. 1987). 
 196. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 cmt. b (2015). 
 197. Bibe, supra note 103, at 140. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2545 (2015). 
 200. Bibe, supra note 103, at 139. 
 201. See id. at 138–41. 
 202. See id. 
 203. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2015). 
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an action falls under redhibition so that he could have a chance to 
repair the item and ultimately be held liable for a lesser amount.204  
Furthermore, a purchased thing can fail to meet the particular 
purposes of the purchaser but still be fit for its ordinary use and not 
afflicted with a hidden and latent defect. However, a thing with a 
latent, hidden defect would generally be unfit for its ordinary 
purpose and one would assume that the reverse would also be 
true—thus the confusion. 
To out-of-state parties conducting business in the mixed 
jurisdiction of Louisiana, this peculiar and confusing overlap can 
be the cause of much consternation. Parties cannot be sure with 
any certainty as to their exact responsibilities vis-à-vis each other. 
This is made more difficult when trying to make a determination as 
to the potential liability of a party seeking to make an investment 
or conduct a series of purchases or sales in Louisiana. Moreover, 
non-Louisiana parties may be surprised to learn that the warranty 
of fitness also applies to immovable property; the warranty is 
relegated to only movable property under the UCC.205 From a 
seller’s point of view, he must be careful not to evidence to the 
purchaser that he knows of the purchaser’s particular intended use 
of the property so as not to possibly trigger the heightened standard 
under the warranty of fitness.206  
Recent cases reveal the continued difficulty that courts have 
with the reconciliation of these related, but essentially different, 
warranties. In the 2000 case of Badon v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had a chance 
to ruminate on the warranty of fitness and its interaction with 
redhibition through a claim for damages caused by cigarette 
smoking.207 The matter before the court was a procedural one, but, 
in reaching the ultimate holding, the court meditated on what was 
necessary to succeed in a cause of action under redhibition and 
under the warranty of fitness when they were brought together.208 
In doing so, the court stated that the ability to prevail depended 
upon: 
(1) whether the fact that smoking cigarettes has serious 
adverse health effects and is addictive constitutes a 
redhibitive defect in the cigarettes or a defect warranted 
against under article 2475; (2) whether it is judicially known 
that at the relevant time there was such common knowledge 
                                                                                                             
 204. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2522 (2015). 
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of the adverse effects of cigarette smoking as to preclude such 
redhibition and article 2475 claims; and (3) whether the lack 
of privity between the Louisiana wholesalers and Badon 
precludes her redhibition and article 2475 claims against those 
wholesalers who were not, and did not with respect to 
consumers occupy the position of, manufacturers of the 
cigarettes.209 
Here again—as seen in some cases prior to the official adoption of 
the warranty of fitness in 1993—the court declared that the 
warranties are separate and distinct, but then combined the two 
when analyzing their constituent parts.210  
The first element calls into question whether cigarettes have an 
inherent defect or vice.211 This language leans more toward the 
redhibition analysis, because it fails to focus at all on the intended 
or ordinary use of cigarettes and whether these particular cigarettes 
in question could meet that use.212 The second element goes 
toward the knowledge of the courts at the time of such vices or 
defects.213 Strangely, this concept is out of place in the analysis 
under either of the warranties. It asks nothing of the ordinary or 
particular use of the thing with respect to the purchaser and, insofar 
as redhibition goes, it adds an extra-codal element in introducing 
the relevancy of whether it was the common knowledge of the 
courts at the time that cigarettes posed a health risk.214  
Lastly, the relevancy of manufacturers (who are deemed to be 
in bad faith in redhibition) is grafted into the warranty of fitness 
analysis, even though Civil Code article 2524 does not provide for 
different rules for these types of parties.215 Through the lens of this 
court’s analysis, it is difficult to tell with any certainty what is 
actually taking place in the jurisprudence.216 On the one hand, it 
appears the court was viewing the warranty of fitness as a subpart 
or component of redhibition.217 On the other, the court may have 
been trying to expand the scope of what constitutes redhibition.218 
It appears fairly clear that, at least in Badon, the court is certainly 
                                                                                                             
 209. See id. 
 210. Id. at 285–87. 
 211. Id. at 285. 
 212. See id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See id. 
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not recognizing the warranty of fitness as an independent cause of 
action.219 
Similarly, in the 2000 case of Cunard Line Ltd. Co. v. Datrex, 
Inc., a warranty claim arose over the proper prescriptive period for an 
action related to defective and incorrectly installed cruise ship 
lights.220 As in Badon, the court in Cunard recognized that redhibition 
and the warranty of fitness are two separate warranties.221 The 
petitioner alleged that the lights were “unsuitable for ordinary use in a 
cruise ship” and that the plaintiff “did in fact rely upon DATREX’S 
skill, judgment and representations regarding the” selection and 
installation of the lights.222 Alongside these allegations, the plaintiff 
also challenged the defective nature of the lights under redhibition.223  
Strangely—and despite having made the proper allegations for a 
claim under the warranty of fitness—the court held that because the 
plaintiff’s “cause of action is based on the allegedly defective nature 
of the LLL systems, it is limited to the prescriptive period for 
redhibitory defects and may not avail itself of the ten-year 
prescriptive period for conventional obligations.”224 Here again the 
courts are struggling to sort through the two warranties and 
matching the facts to the requirements in a way that creates a 
coherent and reliable enforcement of rights.225 However, in Datrex 
the court did a better job of distinguishing between the two 
warranties by specifically recognizing that they were separate legal 
concepts with separate prescriptive rules, which the court in Badon 
struggled with when it appeared to describe fitness as being 
subsumed by redhibition.226 
In the most recent case on the warranty of fitness, the court in 
Fontenot v. Saxby dealt with the sale of immovable property to an 
individual who was precluded from building a residence on a 
parcel because of a building restriction.227 She sued her seller’s 
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predecessor-in-title who had originally subdivided the land, 
claiming breach of the seller’s warranty against redhibition and the 
warranty of fitness.228 The court held that any claims in redhibition 
were prescribed, but then, after reciting Louisiana Civil Code article 
2425, stated that the plaintiff Fontenot:  
[D]oes not allege in her petition or brief that she relied on 
any skill or judgment of Saxby in choosing this particular 
piece of property and therefore cannot claim that under this 
article the thing was not fit for its intended use. Accordingly, 
the record does not support that Fontenot is entitled to any 
review of her relief under the general rules of contract.229 
 It is noticeable that the court pools together the general 
provisions of the warranty of fitness dealing with a thing’s 
ordinary use with the stipulations where its particular use comes 
into play.230 Under the court’s holding, one would think that if 
there is no reliance on the skill of the seller in order to support the 
selection of the property for the purchaser’s particular use, then 
there can be no claim for a warranty of fitness at all.231 This is 
clearly not the case under the plain words of the first part of Civil 
Code article 2524, which states “[t]he thing sold must be 
reasonably fit for its ordinary use.”232 
As seen through these recent cases, Louisiana’s anchoring to 
redhibition has resulted in the watering down of both the warranty 
of fitness and redhibition because both of their requirements and 
elements are often conflated, and, as a sign of its questionable 
viability, claims under the fitness warranty are rarely successful.233  
The anchor effect, in the case of redhibition and fitness, has 
done equal harm to both institutions. Sometimes courts combine 
rehibition and the warranty of fitness; other times they appear to 
favor redhibition, having it subsume fitness; and still at other times 
they appear to expand redhibition using concepts from the warranty 
of fitness.234 In doing so, this mixed jurisdiction’s general law of 
warranty has been anchored down, both becoming less like the 
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uniform laws of other states and contributing to a less competitive 
commercial environment.  
III. ANCHORING THE LAW OF CONTRACTUAL FAIRNESS 
One of the most well recognized principles of the common law 
is freedom of contract.235 This precept stands for the notion that 
private parties are generally free to enter into whatever agreements 
they deem necessary, appropriate, or desirable, just as long as they 
are not against public policy.236 At the heart of this concept is the 
idea that markets work best and commerce flourishes most when 
individuals are able to enter into private dealings without the heavy 
hand of government oversight or burdensome legal restrictions to 
weigh them down.237 Such freedom encourages innovation in 
business dealings, which in turn supports and encourages 
economic growth and prosperity.238 
However, there are instances where public policy dictates that 
the benefits of certain agreements are outweighed by their negative 
consequences.239 Such examples include agreements that are 
illegal, immoral, or are unjust to disadvantaged or vulnerable 
parties.240 In these instances, the law seeks to limit the general 
liberties of contract by placing restraints or outright prohibitions on 
what may be agreed upon.241 This is particularly the case when the 
law seeks to protect a party that has unequal or little to no 
bargaining power in negotiations.242 
Although mixed-jurisdiction judges in Louisiana have often 
declared that “[c]ourts are not created to relieve men of their bad 
bargains made,”243 the state’s law of conventional obligations 
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(contracts) nonetheless endeavors, albeit in a narrow fashion, to 
strike a careful balance between freedom of contract and protecting 
against unjust agreements.244 This is seen best through the long-
held civilian institution of lesion beyond moiety, which seeks to 
give recourse to a seller of corporeal immovable property (tangible 
real property) when the price paid is less than one-half the fair 
market value.245 Under this concept, the law places a bright-line 
limitation on the ability of private parties to determine the amount 
that ought to be paid for property.246  
Similarly, in some respects to lesion, since at least the 1920s, 
Louisiana has utilized a phantom version of the common law’s 
doctrine of unconscionability which seeks to curtail contracts 
where one of the parties to the agreement is determined to be 
overly vulnerable or lacks sufficient bargaining power.247 Although 
never specifically or formally incorporating the concept into 
Louisiana law, the state’s courts have nonetheless frequently used 
its precepts—under the guise of existing, legislatively created 
institutions—to undo or modify contracts that they determine to be 
unjust or inequitable.248 
As with redhibition and the warranty of fitness, both lesion and 
unconscionability seek to place rules on the freedoms of the 
marketplace in order to balance the equities and provide safety and 
protection to the unwitting buyer.249 Both institutions represent a 
sort of conflict between the citadels of the civil law and the 
clashing waters of the common law sea. However, one of the 
institutions is narrowly tailored and specific, while the other is 
broad and vague.250 Although unconscionability gives Louisiana 
courts wide latitude to police unjust agreements in whatever form 
they may take, lesion is limited in the type of harm and injustice it 
seeks to thwart.251  
Although such a limited remedy may have made sense in a more 
agrarian or less complex commercial economy, the intricate and 
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sophisticated business and consumer world of today necessitates 
broader and more flexible remedies.252 For instance, lesion’s focus 
on the disparity of the price versus the value of the thing is only but 
one component of the much broader doctrine of unconscionability 
that extends to more general issues involving deception and 
unfairness. These additional instances of contractual injustice—all 
in the absence of legislative action—have been developed in a subtle 
way by Louisiana courts in order to meet the expectations of a 
changing society.253 However, despite this subconscious desire to 
expand such remedies, lesion, a mainstay of Louisiana’s civil law 
tradition, has remained unchanged.254 By anchoring itself to this 
rigid and limited institution, Louisiana law has been forced to morph 
in an intellectually insincere and unclear way in order to 
accommodate a changing consumer marketplace.255 
A. The Civil Law Doctrine: Lesion Beyond Moiety 
The right to invoke lesion beyond moiety arises from the 
Louisiana Civil Code’s pronouncement that the price paid for 
immovable property “must not be out of all proportion with the 
value of the thing sold.”256 Such a concept seeks to protect the 
seller who may be unsophisticated in his negotiations or who 
suffers at the hands of an exceedingly manipulative and cunning 
buyer.257 Further, it also seeks to protect the rights of the seller’s 
creditors who wish to safeguard against the seller divesting himself 
of his assets for consideration that is less than that which would 
otherwise be obtained in the fair and open market.258 As a further 
limitation, lesion is only available for corporeal immovable 
property (tangible real property), and nothing else.259  
The theory behind lesion comes from the idea that, in a true 
commutative contract, one gives up something of value in return 
for something of roughly equal value.260 The contract is no longer 
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thought of as equal when the amount received is less than one-half 
the value of the thing that is given up.261 In those cases involving 
the contract of sale, the law creates an unrebuttable presumption 
that the seller must have been in error in having given up the thing, 
because he would surely not have agreed to do so if he knew what 
comparatively little he was receiving in return.262 The law takes 
such a strong stance as to this presumption that—unlike with the 
warranties of condition—a party may not waive or otherwise do 
away with the action for lesion even if he does so expressly in 
writing.263 Even a seller who has renounced lesion and made such 
waiver a principal term of the sale can nevertheless still bring an 
action for lesion if the requirements are met.264 If a seller is 
successful under lesion he may seek to have the thing returned to 
him, and he must return the purchase price, or, in the alternative, 
the buyer will give the seller a supplement in an amount sufficient 
to bring the price up to the fair market value of the thing sold.265  
But the most striking and important aspect of lesion is its very 
limited scope. For instance, the only avenue that may be used to 
avoid an action for lesion would be to prove that the transaction 
was actually an onerous donation.266 In order to qualify for this 
classification, however, the transaction would have to meet the 
form and intent requirements for a valid donation.267 Further, the 
action must be brought within a one-year peremptive period from 
the date of the sale.268 Special additional rules apply to prevent the 
rescission of the sale for lesion when the buyer has subsequently 
sold the property to a third party, but even then some form of 
recourse is accorded to the seller.269 Various protections are also 
given to secured parties who obtain a security interest in the 
property prior to the action for lesion being exercised.270 Each rule 
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is specific and detailed and avoids extending any discretion to 
courts that might attempt to expand lesion’s limited scope.271 
1. History of the Doctrine 
Much like redhibition, lesion is long-standing on the civil law 
island.272 Although preceded by a more limited Roman law institution 
for protecting minors called restitutio in integrum, lesion beyond 
moiety first appeared in substantial form during the time of the early 
Christian Roman emperors.273 This early form of lesion, called 
lasesio enormis, was meant to protect petty landowners who were 
often under harsh economic pressure during the later years of the 
empire to sell their lands to their wealthier, aristocratic neighbors.274 
By preventing a sale that would yield to the improvident landowner 
less than half the value of his land, Roman law sought to afford 
protections and a balancing of the equities in these transactions.275  
Later, as Christianity became more entrenched in early Europe, 
the idea behind lesion would permeate into the central tenets of 
Canon Law—which, among other things, demanded that a fair and 
reasonable return be given in every contract—and eventually began 
to pervade all forms of contract law.276 This great wave of Christian 
legal thinking made its way into other forms of transactions aside 
from merely those involving property.277 Contracts for services and 
interest on loans, as well as any other form of agreements whereby 
an excessive advantage was given to any one party were also 
included under lesion.278  
Turning to early French law, because of the economic and 
political woes that were a hallmark of 17th and 18th century pre-
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revolutionary France, litigation dealing with lesion was rampant in 
the French courts.279 This sparked a general fear that the institution 
was causing serious damage to and uncertainty in the stability of 
private transactions.280 Thus, during the tumultuous legal reforms 
brought about by the various post-revolutionary governments, lesion 
beyond moiety was eliminated in its entirety.281  
Finally, the Emperor Napoleon reintroduced the institution of 
lesion when he promulgated the French Code Civil.282 However, its 
breadth and substance were much diminished from its earlier 
canonical form.283 For instance, the action was made available only 
in cases of sales and partitions and restricted to only immovable 
property.284 At the time, this restricted application was supported 
by the notion that movable property had little value compared to 
that of land and that land, as a general rule, was subject to less 
variability in value.285 It was at this time that the institution was 
also limited to only the seller under the theory that only the person 
giving up the immovable could reasonably be susceptible to 
necessitous circumstances.286  
2. Louisiana’s Incorporation of the Doctrine 
It was in this form, as articulated in the French Code Civil, that 
the institution of lesion beyond moiety was incorporated into 
Louisiana law and the law of most other mixed jurisdictions.287 Few 
changes—such as the time period for bringing an action and the 
circumstances governing when rescission, as opposed to 
supplementing the price, may be demanded—have been made to 
Louisiana’s law of lesion, and it remains largely the same as when it 
was originally enacted into the French Code Civil.288 Nonetheless, 
this preservation is consistent with Louisiana’s strong desire to 
uphold its traditional institutions, even to the point of allowing them 
to remain relatively unchanged for multiple centuries.  
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With lesion, Louisiana courts have declined to augment the 
circumstances under which it may arise, even when the facts of a 
case might otherwise merit an equitable expansion of the concept. 
For instance, courts have rejected using lesion for the sale of 
incorporeals, regardless of the inadequacy of the price or the 
vulnerable position of the buyer, such as with the sale of rights of 
inheritance, obligations, and intellectual property.289 And, despite 
the development of markets for property other than real estate—as 
well as changing economic circumstances that might impact what 
is deemed a “fair” price—lesion has not been otherwise modified 
or expanded to take these changing expectations of a modern world 
into account.290  
One area that has been the source of particular trouble for 
Louisiana courts involves cases for lesion where the right at issue 
involves immovable property, but not purely corporeal immovable 
property. For instance, the sale of servitudes has been held to be 
outside the protections of lesion.291 On the other hand, in cases 
involving the transfer of mineral rights, courts have upheld the 
existence of the minerals as a valid component in computing the 
fair market value of the land being conveyed for purposes of 
determining whether the purchase price is lesionary.292  
Mineral rights are a form of incorporeal immovable under 
Louisiana law.293 Because of this, they are generally not subject to 
lesion, even when they are transferred for less than half their fair 
market value.294 This general rule is further stated in article 7 of the 
Louisiana Mineral Code, which declares that lesion is inapplicable 
to all “mineral transactions.”295 But the court in Hornsby v. Slade 
added a bit more nuance to this general proposition.296 In Hornsby, 
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immovable property was sold for a certain price, but once it was in 
the hands of the purchaser, it was discovered that valuable minerals 
existed under the property.297 The seller brought an action to rescind 
the sale on the grounds of lesion, stating that the value of the 
minerals should go into the overall value calculation of the 
property.298 The court stated that while mineral rights are generally a 
form of incorporeal movables, until they are reduced to possession 
they are an integral part of the land.299 As such, their presence in 
conjunction with the immovable property is not an inconsequential 
factor in determining the fair market value of the land.300 The court 
specifically held that because mineral rights are component parts of 
the land itself that their value should be used for purposes of the 
“lesionary inquiry” when they are sold with the land.301  
In sum, lesion is largely unchanged since its earliest days in 
Louisiana. The rationale of the Romans and the French that 
initially dictated the rules and limitations of lesion have continued 
to govern its applicability, even when such rationale is arguably no 
longer valid.  
B. The Common Law Doctrine: Unconscionability 
But lesion is not alone in Louisiana’s arsenal of remedies to 
police unjust contracts. A separate but similar common law device 
has been transplanted in Louisiana law to assist in this endeavor as 
well. The doctrine of unconscionability can be traced back to early 
English law, which sought to provide prohibitions for certain 
contracts that “no man in his senses and not under delusion would 
make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept 
on the other.”302 Since then, a multitude of American states have 
utilized this principle, and even the United States Supreme Court 
has referenced some form of the doctrine on occasion.303  
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Courts have often declared that the power to police private 
contracts in this manner is part of the judiciary’s inherent and 
intrinsic powers, with no further authorization being necessary.304 
Consequently, the power is not derived from legislation, but rather 
from general jurisprudential and constitutional principles that allow 
the judiciary to refuse to enforce unfair contracts or provisions that 
are deemed too burdensome, onerous, or one-sided.305  
1. History of the Doctrine 
Although the doctrine was seldom used in its earliest period, as 
goods came into mass production and as the marketplace grew and 
became more complex, courts became more sensitive to commercial 
injustices and came to use the doctrine more frequently.306 This 
motivation was derived from the fear that certain individuals, 
because of their skill, profession, economic strength, stature, or 
association, were in a position to monopolize and exert undue 
control over consumers.307 Such abuse would impair and forever 
mar the common and ordinary understanding of fairness in arms-
length transactions.308 As a result, courts began to view themselves 
as the natural protectors and mediators of the marketplace and began 
employing the doctrine in more frequent and robust ways.309 Certain 
contracts or clauses were deemed so offensive to societal notions of 
fairness and equity that they were held unconscionable and therefore 
unenforceable. 310  
In order to validate the use of this equitable theory, courts 
couched their use of the doctrine as merely a manifestation of their 
ability to invalidate any agreement on the basis of a defect in 
consent.311 Since the agreement was so out of sorts with the natural 
interests of a particular party and so onerous and overreaching, no 
reasonable person would have knowingly agreed to it.312 Thus, the 
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party lacked the requisite legal consent, and the contract could be 
annulled.313  
It should be noted that this type of judicial remedy making is a 
hallmark of the common law system—an occurrence that would, at 
least in theory, be loathed in the civil law. Common law chancery 
courts, going back to early English law, have always had the 
ability to confect equitable remedies that, although not specifically 
provided for by legislation, were justified because of fairness 
considerations.314 Civil law courts, however, have traditionally 
been restricted by design from creating such equitable remedies 
since the focus under the civilian system is solely on legislation 
and custom, rather than the exercise of independent judicial 
power.315 Mixed jurisdictions historically adhere to this civilian 
approach in defining the proper role of their judges as well.316 
In the 1970s, when Article 2 of the UCC was first promulgated, 
a provision was included to finally codify the longstanding, judge-
made doctrine of unconscionability.317 Section 2-302 makes a 
specific grant of power to courts to police contracts that are 
unconscionable.318 In doing so, it asks “whether, in the light of the 
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the 
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to 
be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of 
the making of the contract.”319 The comments to the article mention 
that this practice had been longstanding as a jurisprudential doctrine, 
but that now it was being placed into statute and legislatively 
sanctioned.320 Most UCC scholars attribute this endorsement as 
being part of a larger response to the fact that standard-form 
contracts—so notorious for their unevenness and overreaching 
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provisions—had become so prolific as to constitute the majority of 
all agreements entered into by private persons in the United 
States.321 By putting the doctrine into statute, the drafters hoped to 
lend some clarity, consistency, and stability to the otherwise 
unwieldy and inconsistently (if not intellectually dishonestly) 
applied doctrine.322  
As of this writing, forty-eight American states have adopted 
Section 2-302, with Louisiana and California being the only two that 
have chosen not to incorporate the doctrine through legislation.323 
However, since Section 2-302 contains so few specific directives on 
how the unconscionability analysis should be applied, many courts 
have adopted the two-part analysis that was first developed by the 
noted American contract law scholar Professor Arthur Allen Leff.324  
The first prong of Professor Leff’s test requires courts to 
analyze the procedural aspects of the bargain, such as evidence of 
oppression, lack of meaningful choice, an inability to read or 
understand, lack of education, and a weak socio-economic 
status.325 The second prong looks to the substantive aspects of the 
contract such as the commercial reasonableness of the terms and 
provisions of the contract itself, the allocation of risks, fair remedy 
and penalty clauses, and an equitable cost-price balance.326 
Nonetheless, courts have been varied as to how the prongs should 
be used, with some requiring evidence of violations of both 
procedural and substantive aspects, while others adopting a sliding 
scale approach whereby more of one aspect can make up for a lack 
of quantity in the other.327 The difficulty that common law courts 
have had with fashioning an effective framework from which to 
analyze unconscionability has been an issue that has plagued 
Louisiana courts as well in their application of the doctrine. 
2. Louisiana’s Incorporation of the Doctrine 
Although not having adopted Section 2-302—or any 
meaningful amount of UCC Article 2 for that matter—Louisiana is 
no stranger to unconscionability.328 The substance of the doctrine 
has been variously employed by the judges of this mixed 
jurisdiction to police contracts that they deem unfair or unjust even 
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though it was never specifically enacted into the Civil Code or 
directly called as such by courts.329 This is chiefly done—much 
like common law courts prior to codification—through utilizing 
other existing concepts and institutions found in the Civil Code as 
a mask for what is ultimately an exercise of the doctrine of 
unconscionability. The first case to touch upon the concept was the 
1890 Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Lazarus v. McGuirk 
where the court held that: 
[A] judgment will be annulled when a party, having good 
defenses to an action, is prevented from urging them by the 
acts, promises, and representations of his adversary, in 
which he trusted, and by reason thereof a judgment has 
been rendered, which it is against good conscience to 
execute.330  
In Lazarus, the court discussed, in brief, its inherent 
constitutional powers to regulate and control the way in which it 
administered judgments. In making these declarations, the court 
introduced the idea, through the lens of fraud, that certain 
judgments could be denied or voided because of unconscionable 
behavior by the parties.331 This early version of unconscionability 
was later expanded to include judgments granted under 
unconscionable circumstances involving rights in a succession.332 
Over time, Louisiana courts have become somewhat more direct 
in wielding (or threatening to wield) the doctrine of unconscionability 
in those situations where a clause or agreement is deemed too harsh or 
oppressive. For instance, in the case of Dennis Miller Pest Controls, 
Inc. v. Wells, the court discussed the possibility of a liquidated 
damages clause being “so exorbitant as to be unconscionable and 
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will not, for equitable consideration, be invoked.”333 In an even 
more direct decision, the intermediate appellate court in McKelvy 
v. Milford declared a provision in a real estate listing agreement—
which provided that the realtor was entitled to her commission upon 
the signing of a purchase agreement with a buyer, regardless of 
whether the property was actually sold—to be “unconscionable.”334 
In an effort to validate its exercise of such non-legislative power, the 
McKelvy court cited a now-repealed Louisiana Civil Code article 
that was based on Christian doctrine.335 The article proclaimed that 
the quintessential rules of interpretation of contracts in Louisiana 
were “founded in the Christian principle not to do unto others that 
which we would not wish others should do unto us; and on the 
moral maxim of the law that no one ought to enrich himself at the 
expense of another.”336  
Still, at other times Louisiana courts have been more subtle in 
their endorsement of unconscionability and have only mentioned 
their ability to police private agreements in passing dicta.337 For 
example, the court in Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Fell discussed 
the potential, but did not make a determination, for voiding a 
provision in a fidelity bond contract whereby the insured party was 
prohibited from challenging the bonding party’s sole determination 
regarding whether an indemnity payment was due.338 Also, in 
Roberson v. C.W. Maris and J.H. Jenkins Contractors, Inc. v. City 
of Denham Springs, the courts discussed, but did not render a 
judgment on, the notion that vague or overly broad provisions in a 
construction or building contract could be deemed unconscionable 
and therefore unenforceable.339 
Although some might argue that the policing of contracts by 
Louisiana courts is merely born from general civil law concepts of 
good faith and meaningful consent, or that other doctrines such as 
estoppel were really the tools at play, the language used by the 
Louisiana courts in making these determinations seems much more 
reminiscent of unconscionability.340 The phraseology of declaring 
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that a provision is “unconscionable” is not a term that has roots in 
the civil law.341 However, it is an expression that has meaning and 
a significant history at common law.342 This is particularly true 
given the use of the phrase in connection with statements about 
overreaching and undue power between private parties. Thus, it is 
logical to conclude that its presence in Louisiana law could, 
therefore, have derived from the common law.343 In many ways, 
Louisiana courts are actually tracking the nomenclature of their 
common law cousins in this regard.344 And in fact, the subtle 
incorporation of the doctrine of unconscionability into Louisiana 
jurisprudence is emblematic of the broader subconscious desire of 
this mixed jurisdiction to incorporate legal concepts that are more 
in line with the laws of the common law jurisdictions that surround 
it.345 As individuals in other states have come to expect and 
presume the ability of courts to police oppressive or unjust 
contracts, Louisiana courts have dipped into the common law 
waters and grafted such concepts—even if through seemingly 
disingenuous ways—so as not to be viewed as out of step with 
modern legal expectations.  
C. Conflict Between the Two: Obsolescence and Opacity 
Both lesion beyond moiety and unconscionability seek to right 
wrongs and provide fairness between the parties where the court 
deems that one party has been taken advantage of or has unduly 
induced another to agree to something that a reasonable man would 
not.346 In each case, the law seeks to step around and over the plain 
words of the agreement and instill a certain level of extra-party 
justice into the transaction.347  
However, as noted above, these two doctrines are extremely 
different.348 Unconscionability is broad in scope and category and 
seeks to capture a seemingly endless array of circumstances and 
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agreements under which a party may be subject to the heavy hand or 
undue manipulation of a party whose bargaining power is superior.349 
Also, courts have wide latitude in utilizing their powers under this 
doctrine because it lacks definite boundaries.350 For most of its 
history, unconscionability has been viewed as an inherent power, 
vested in courts under constitutional and fundamental legal 
principles.351 Without a formal written structure to cage the judicial 
analysis, the possibilities for unconscionability’s use are endless.352  
And even with the advent of UCC Section 2-302 courts are still 
left with great discretion as to when and how they may use the 
concept to void or modify agreements.353 Since Section 2-302 
contains so little guidance on the specifics of how the rule should 
be implemented, many have argued that it merely enshrined into 
law the general and broad principle that courts had already been 
employing for centuries.354 
Lesion, on the other hand, is a narrow and more limited 
device.355 It too seeks to nominally protect the weak against the 
heavy hand of the strong, but does so in a more restricted way.356 
First, lesion is only available for sales of corporeal immovable 
property.357 The sale of movable property, however valuable or 
numerous, may not be rescinded for lesion, no matter how out of 
proportion the price is compared to the value.358 This limitation is 
rooted in the civil law’s historical views of real property being the 
chief indicator of wealth.359 But this rationale also has its flaws.360 
Today, movable property in the form of stocks, bonds, and other 
financial instruments—not to mention the ever-growing realm of 
virtual property such as social media accounts, mailing lists, and 
other noncorporeal rights—are considered to have immense 
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value.361 Further, lesion presupposes that meaningful manipulation 
goes in only one direction—only the seller can invoke the right.362 A 
buyer who is under undue pressure or is being oppressed or 
manipulated by the seller to purchase property for a price that is out of 
proportion to its value is without recourse.363 Despite changes in 
modern life and views on different forms of property, Louisiana law 
has not modified lesion to account for these changing expectations.364 
The reason for the existence of these two similar but 
inconsistent doctrines derives from the inherent struggle behind the 
anchor effect. Louisiana has refused to adopt Article 2 of the UCC 
because it was deemed to be too out of step and incompatible with 
the state’s civil law scheme.365 And part of that involved 
maintaining the ancient institution of lesion, which traces its roots 
back to French and Roman law.366 To lose lesion would be to lose 
a legal concept that has existed in Louisiana since its earliest 
days.367 Such a loss would be repugnant to the mixed jurisdictional 
sense of identity and tradition, even if its maintenance has ceased 
to serve a useful purpose. But in that vein, Louisiana was not 
willing to change and modify lesion to make it more in line with 
unconscionability or to expand its scope to encompass a wider 
array of scenarios and types of transactions. And this is true despite 
the fact that many civilian jurisdictions such as Switzerland, 
Austria, Germany, and particularly Quebec have done so.368 
As the economy has become more regional and national in 
scale and scope, the common law waves have come crashing hard 
on the shores of the Louisiana civil law island.369 The expectations 
of the everyday man presupposes that if an agreement is so harsh 
and unjust, and his position is so weak—because of education, 
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status, position, or wealth—so as to render him wholly incapable 
of meaningfully and knowingly entering into the agreement, that a 
court may employ powers of equity and justice to remediate unjust 
enforcement.370  
This is particularly true since the 2007–2008 economic crisis and 
the advent of stronger consumer protection laws,371 both at the state 
and federal level in the United States and abroad, which have brought 
the concept of fairness and equity in private agreements (particularly 
in standard form agreements) into the limelight of political 
discourse.372 Over time and in the face of such expectations, 
Louisiana courts have had no choice but to splice the common law, 
UCC concept of unconscionability into state law in such a way as to 
avoid a wholesale adoption—which would offend civilian principles—
but still enable enforcement and tacit recognition of the doctrine.373 
Unfortunately, its disguised implementation has logically drowned 
out the need for lesion and, because of unconscionability’s wide 
scope, the doctrine has washed away some of the historical gilt that 
has characterized lesion, thus revealing its many limitations and 
weaknesses in the modern world. 
Under these circumstances, the result has been Louisiana’s 
maintenance of an institution that is out of step with modern life and 
the economic and social realities of the day.374 It has further 
occasioned the judicial embracing of a concept that the state’s 
legislature has heretofore refused to adopt in order to further the 
state’s ability to compete in the integrated, cross-border economy.375 
However, both concepts at their core seek to accomplish the same 
goal, but one is so steeped in history and tradition that it fails to 
face the realities of a changing world, while the other is so broad 
and unmanageable that it causes uncertainty.376 By not specifically 
recognizing unconscionability, Louisiana jurisprudence on the 
issue is left in disorder and lacks coherent and consistent 
parameters, which in turn makes the realm of possibilities for its 
application both endless and unpredictable.377  
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Thus results the anchor effect in Louisiana contract law. With 
redhibition and fitness, the anchor effect has resulted in two 
institutions that overlap and become conflated with one another to 
such a degree that both lose much of their potency.378 But with 
lesion and unconscionability, the anchoring effect has resulted in 
the existence of two separate institutions with the same goals, but 
with wholly different and inconsistent approaches.379 Until this 
disjointed legal arrangement is recognized and corrected, each of 
these concepts will continue to exist in an effort to provide justice 
and fairness in contracting, but neither doing so in an efficient or 
truly effective way.380  
IV. THE ANCHOR EFFECT IN CONTEXT: A SOCIAL 
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 
As described above, the anchor effect is caused by the retaining 
of existing civil law institutions alongside the incorporation of new 
common law concepts, and this has resulted in an array of negative 
consequences to Louisiana’s bijural legal regime.381 In seeking to 
further understand the causes behind the anchor effect, after having 
explored its various instances, it is important to consider the 
psychology of what underpins Louisiana’s intrinsic inclination to 
cling somewhat inflexibly to established civil law institutions when 
engaging in legal reform. By understanding this psychology, one is 
able to understand the unique and particular social science nuances 
that motivate legal reform in all mixed jurisdictions.  
This anchoring is rooted in more than a sheer appreciation for 
history or an aversion to change. Both assertions are too simplistic 
and suggest that the anchor effect is caused merely by a casual 
affinity for the familiar and the known. In fact, social scientists 
have long argued against the overly basic yet widely held truism 
that people generally resist change.382 This statement has been 
described as being overly one-dimensional in that it fails to 
recognize the many situations in which change is welcomed and 
even embraced.383 For instance, people rarely ever resist an 
increase in pay, the chance to work on a project which they find 
stimulating, or an increase in the amount of resources or tools 
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available to accomplish a given task.384 All of these involve a 
change, but few—if any—individuals are opposed to them.385 A 
more complex understanding of society’s resistance to change, as 
well as how tradition and history play a part in decision-making 
processes, is essential to giving full consideration to the deep-
rooted psychology and sociology of how the anchor effect has 
come to exist and operate in America’s sole mixed jurisdiction 
and, by extension, in all mixed jurisdictions.386  
A. Self-Preservation and the Resistance to Change 
Of fundamental importance to understanding why the legal 
reforms described above have been subject to such subconscious 
resistance, one must understand what lies behind this struggle.387 In 
the context of the anchor effect it is necessary to look at what 
specific factors underlie efforts to maintain existing civil law 
institutions even in the face of incorporating new and/or conflicting 
legal devices.388  
Social science literature gives some insight into this inquiry. 
First, in general, change threatens the status quo.389 In Louisiana, 
like all mixed jurisdictions, the civil law system of private law has 
existed for hundreds of years and is both widely familiar and 
known to the state’s inhabitants.390 Accordingly, there is a natural 
inclination to maintain the current state of affairs because such 
familiarity brings with it the ability to confidently and comfortably 
navigate the legal system.391 After a given community first 
becomes comfortable with a scheme of laws, the emphasis subtly 
shifts to keeping those laws in place so as to ensure stability and 
permanence.392  
Additionally, change is further resisted because it calls into 
question self-confidence and one’s personal ability to perform.393 
As generations of Louisiana lawyers and jurists have gained and 
honed their skills under the existing civil law system, the 
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incorporation of an entirely new structure and the abandonment of 
the old calls into question continued viability. As the adage goes, 
“can you teach an old dog new tricks”?394 Can, or will, parties who 
are so intimately familiar and content with a given scheme become 
successfully acclimated to an entirely new structure? Thus, a 
psychological element of self-preservation pervades the legal 
reforms described above because the incorporation of new 
concepts necessarily requires the need to learn and become 
proficient in new rules and procedures.395 As new legal devices are 
incorporated from the common law and other uniform law sources, 
a natural tension is created between feelings of familiarity and 
anxiety about learning new rules.396 
Further, change is resisted because, at a fundamental level, it 
calls into question how a given group understands and makes sense 
of the world.397 The structures that a society builds around it—
including its legal system—reflect a given set of values and 
norms.398 They are honed over time to be an extension of the 
culture, principles, and attitudes of the place.399 Louisiana’s civil 
law structure can be said to follow this same theory. Legal reform 
of this system, however necessary, brings about a tacit 
acknowledgement that things can be done a better way or that the 
current set of rules are inadequate.400  
Although some reforms may bring about only small or singular 
changes in a given institution, it is the psychology of that change 
rather than the substance that can trigger a need for self-
justification and defensive reasoning.401 It is also true that within 
the decision-making body there may be distrust among the 
members as to those leaders championing the reform—as seen 
through the introduction of the common law by the congressionally 
appointed governor William Claiborne in Louisiana’s early days of 
statehood.402 This mistrust can stem from a different understanding 
or assessment of the circumstances calling for the reform, as well 
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as an innate desire to defend established social relations that are 
perceived as being under threat.403 Lastly, groups associate change 
with stress.404 This stress impacts not only personal feelings and 
emotions, but also organizational behaviors.405 As an existing 
institution gives way to another, subconscious feelings of anxiety 
are sparked, as there becomes a need to understand and assimilate 
oneself to a new order.406  
B. History and Tradition in Decision-Making  
However, it is not enough to simply acknowledge that certain 
changes cause anxiety, fear, stress, and other attendant ills.407 The 
anchor effect is caused by more than just the methodical, every-
day symptoms that come with change.408 Rather, it is the distinct 
and palpable force of tradition and history that makes this mixed 
jurisdiction’s struggle with legal reform all the more tumultuous.409 
Specifically, fidelity to the state’s legal history and tradition is 
what makes the clash against legal change and reform so 
arduous.410  
In general, the literature often describes tradition as being 
“equated with manners and morals of our past, with our origins 
(genesis) and roots, and with our explanation of the present moment 
as a continuum of historical forces through time.”411 Louisiana’s 
civil law tradition very much follows this characterization.412 
Because it chiefly represents the area of the law that governs the 
rights, duties, and obligations of private parties, it, in essence, 
symbolizes feelings about social interaction and interrelational 
obligations.413 The morals of the family, the rights of the consumer, 
the stability of transactions, and the safeguard of property are all 
intimately derived from Louisiana’s ancient civil law tradition.414 
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Not only this, but because of its long-standing and historical nature, 
this legal system links many Louisianans to their ancestry, conjuring 
up images of immigrants, pioneers, and early settlers and the laws 
and traditions that governed and protected them over the course of 
many generations.415  
And, rightly so, tradition should be protected and preserved. 
The wide-scale demand for mass-market uniformity—particularly 
in the quest to enact uniform laws—can often serve as a death 
knell to distinctive legal institutions that are not only historically 
significant, but also fulfill unique needs and purposes that are 
idiosyncratically tied to people and place.416 Mixed jurisdictions 
are often described as melting pots, brimming with cultures and 
value systems that are drawn over many centuries and from across 
different regions.417 In the case of Louisiana, this “multiculturalism 
supports the preservation of differences among people of diverse 
cultures rather than urging them to replace their []identities with 
one single ‘American’ identity.”418 Similarly, the history and 
background of such mixed jurisdictions are also worthy of 
preservation because of the way in which they have helped to 
define many features of the state and its people.  
And, as might be expected, tradition, being of such chief 
societal importance, plays a powerful role in decision-making.419 
Groups chart their future through the “shared recognition of local 
character and tradition,” and these elements help shape subsequent 
decisions about that future.420 This form of mutual recognition has 
been shown to have a heavy influence on law and policy-making 
such as, for example, how local culture has dictated decisions on 
land-use, zoning, and development decisions.421 Such is the case 
with Louisiana’s efforts at legal reform discussed above. Although 
there is often a strong desire to harmonize the law with other 
jurisdictions and create a legal environment that is both competitive 
and mainstream, decision-making regarding how this is accomplished 
is very much tied to feelings of tradition and the preservation of 
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identity.422 It is through an honest recognition that a collective 
selfhood of the past is being incorporated into the decision-making of 
the present that Louisiana’s decision makers and the decision makers 
in other mixed jurisdictions are able to address the causes and 
negative consequences of the anchor effect.423 
C. Forging a Usable Past 
These many elements that contribute to society’s resistance to 
change, as well as the effects of Louisiana’s strong attachment to 
its legal history and tradition, are exemplified in the anchor effect. 
There is a subconscious policy choice made during the legal 
reform process that existing institutions—which are symbolic of 
established and existing social structures and long-held self-
identifying traditions—should be maintained to help temper and 
blunt the perceived harshness, anxiety, and stress that comes with 
change. Social science research expounds on this very point: that 
“[p]eople make choices, self-consciously or not” that are 
“outgrowths of the psychic underbrush” and such choices are 
shaped by the historical forces of “shared experiences or [the] 
background knowledge of participants.”424 “No matter how much 
we emphasize the here-and-now, a self-referential history sets the 
terms for negotiations.”425  
As described in this Article, the choices that are involved in 
engaging in legal reform—whether by the legislature or the courts—
so deeply informed by history and tradition, can sometimes lead to 
negative consequences, but such consequences are made more 
difficult to acknowledge because of the powerful and subconscious 
sociological desire to resist that change. This emphasizes the need 
for legal reformers in mixed jurisdictions—which have such a 
unique and historical tie to their own laws and legal institutions—to 
be frank and self-conscious in acknowledging the historical legal 
culture of the place when enacting reforms so that these traditions 
can be clearly managed and built upon to create a foundation for a 
new set of priorities and values. Mixed jurisdictions, like all 
societies, are charged with forging a “usable past” that stands not 
as a barrier to change and reform, but as an impetus for frequent 
self-examination.426 In the context of the anchor effect, the use of 
tradition through the lens of self-reflection ensures that mixed 
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jurisdictions avoid being trapped in the patterns of their past and, 
rather, engage in the creative endeavor of creating new institutions 
and adjusting the old so as to meet the needs of the present.427 
CONCLUSION 
Change is inevitable. It is needed to bring progress, to develop, 
to grow, and to advance. Change also brings the unforeseen, the 
uncertain, and the untested. Change is particularly difficult because 
it inherently means that something must be left behind to make 
room for something new. And most of all, a wise discernment is 
required to determine when change is unnecessary.  
Mixed jurisdictions are exceptionally susceptible to this 
internal struggle that comes with change because of their unique 
status as civil law states or countries that are surrounded by other 
jurisdictions or systems that are dominated by the common law.428 
For Louisiana, this dichotomy is the source of a host of issues. 
Having to learn or adjust to a new system and a new set of rules 
when doing business or operating in Louisiana, as opposed to any 
other state, can cause frustration, confusion, or, at worst, a 
complete rejection of engaging with the state altogether. In a time 
when competition between states for economic development 
projects, business investments, and highly skilled jobs and 
professionals is greater than ever, the potential for such a negative 
perception or complete rejection has garnered significant attention 
from Louisiana’s leaders.429 
In an effort to keep pace with its neighbors and to diminish the 
image of a state where “things are done differently,” Louisiana has 
incorporated mainstream and national legal concepts into its 
law.430 These have come either through judicial adoption or 
through direct legislation.431 They involve embracing either 
concepts directly from common law cases or borrowing from 
institutions that have been created through national efforts to 
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implement uniform laws.432 Nonetheless, these foreign institutions 
are often fastened to the state’s legal landscape even when the 
horizon is already populated with existing institutions that purport 
to cover the same topic.433 These existing institutions are derived 
from Louisiana’s long-standing civil law tradition.434 This civilian 
tradition, so prized and favored, holds a special, almost sacred, 
place among Louisiana’s legal community.435 To jettison these 
altogether would be a betrayal of the past and an abdication of a 
responsibility that has been passed down in the legal community of 
this mixed jurisdiction since the days of James Brown, Louis 
Moreau Lislet, and the drafters of the 1806 manifesto during 
Louisiana’s early years of statehood.436 
Yet, what has resulted from this dual system of laws is an 
anchoring effect.437 A phenomena whereby incorporating new and 
foreign legal concepts into the law in an effort to become more 
competitive and mainstream, while at the same time maintaining 
longstanding and traditional civil law institutions—with both 
covering approximately the same subject matter or area—Louisiana 
law has actually become less progressive, less competitive, and less 
true to its roots.438 And of this dual system so created, the laws 
governing sale warranties and contractual fairness provide 
particularly potent examples of the negative consequences that can 
result.  
The time has come for Louisiana, and perhaps, by extension, 
other similarly situated mixed jurisdictions, to acknowledge and 
understand the anchor effect and its negative consequences. By 
mooring the law to historical institutions that no longer serve 
contemporary needs, competitive desires are frustrated.439 Similarly, 
by incorporating new common law or uniform law concepts, but not 
adopting them fully or by introducing them but keeping similar 
and/or conflicting civil law institutions in place, the law as a whole 
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becomes less clear and a proper analysis of these institutions can 
become confusing or impossible.440  
A respect and reverence for history and tradition is essential.441 
The civil law aspects of all mixed jurisdictions are important and 
should be protected and preserved. As such, there are many 
instances where an existing civil law institution is superior to and 
far more effective than a mainstream or popular uniform or 
common law concept. A part of respecting and preserving 
traditional legal institutions involves acknowledging when they 
prove to be superior to competing frameworks. When such is the 
case, the existing institution should be maintained and honed, 
rather than abdicated in favor of what is new or fashionable. 
Neglecting to act in such a manner by being clear, thoughtful, and 
honest when engaging in legal reform serves only to further isolate 
mixed jurisdictions on their civil law islands.442  
In the event lawmakers of mixed jurisdictions feel it is in their 
jurisdiction’s best interest to wade into the common law waters, they 
must do so with confidence and they must be deliberate in their 
steps.443 Each foreign legal concept that is adopted must be carefully 
and honestly evaluated to determine whether it meets the needs and 
goals of the locale.444 This analysis must be accompanied by a 
candid appraisal of any current civil law institutions that could 
conflict with, serve the same goals as, or occupy the same area as 
the new concept.445 If the new concept is superior, then the civil law 
institution must be let go and allowed to float adrift.446 However, if 
it is determined that the civil law concept is superior, then it should 
be clearly maintained, and any appropriate modifications should be 
made.447 A foreign legal concept, merely because it is mainstream, 
should not be adopted—however enticing or popular such an 
adoption might be—if it does not clearly prove to be more useful 
and effective than what is already in place.448  
These types of decisions during the law reform process are 
often difficult. They can give birth to much internal struggle about 
the true goals and objectives of a particular jurisdiction, as well as 
how best to meet the mandates of a competitive economy and the 
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modern expectations of a demanding society.449 Nevertheless, such 
challenging decisions must be made so that mixed jurisdictions do 
not find themselves anchored to the past, and so that they may 
confidently, deliberately, and effectively set their sails toward the 
future.450  
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